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Between 1950 and 1953, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) military leaders 
subscribed to a doctrine that incorporated revolutionary guerrilla warfare as standard 
operating procedure during the Korean War. Though influenced by a number of long-
standing cultural and philosophical traditions, the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Military Commission (CCP CMC) relied on Mao Zedong’s approach to warfare. Indeed, 
this doctrine guided Chinese military thought and theory for much of the early twentieth 
century as the Red Army, the guerrillas of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
transitioned into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the conventional forces of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Even after the creation of the PRC, the PLA and 
especially the Chinese People’s Volunteer Forces (CPVF) in Korea continued to operate 
under this doctrine because of the limited industrial and economic development of China. 
This subscription to Mao military thought, however, did not completely divorce the 
doctrine of the PRC from traditional approaches to war.  Indeed, the revolutionary 
guerrilla warfare of Mao demonstrated clear continuity with the methods of eras past 
such as pragmatism, efficiency, and adaptability. 
 The experiences CPVF troops gained from the stalemate of the Korean War 
demonstrated several implications for the future of the twenty-first century. The Korean 
War revealed the limited capabilities of revolutionary guerrilla war outside of the country 
where the cultural-national troops originated. It also demonstrated the military power of 
the PRC and its ability to halt the advances of industrialized and technologically superior 
Western forces, signaling the reestablishment of Chinese political and cultural dominance 
of Asia. Perhaps most important as a “lessons taught” approach to history, the CPVF 
demonstrated the viability of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a means for struggling, 
former colonial states to combat the supposed strengths of Western, industrialized, and 
modern state military powers. 
Grounded in a two-thousand-five-hundred-year literary, philosophical, and 
historic tradition, Mao’s model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare benefited from the rich 
military history of China. In several important aspects, Mao’s applications represent a 
continuation of established Chinese military thoughts and theories, despite the trappings 
of Marxist-Leninist influences. That said, Marxism-Leninism, and the modern-era 
development of guerrilla warfare as a distinct approach to conflict, also guided the 
development of Mao’s theories, wherein his works also demonstrate significant 
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A NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS AND ROMANIZATION 
 
This work employs the pinyin style of Romanization. When a specific source, especially 
a primary source, uses the Wade-Giles system, this author replaced Wade-Giles 
Romanization with pinyin when able. Brackets identify such alterations. Readers may 
refer to footnotes for sources and page numbers to refer to original documents. In the case 
of citations and bibliography, names or authors appear in pinyin, while names of works 
originally in Wade-Giles appear as Wade-Giles. 
 
With relations to names, this work maintains the conventional Chinese model of placing 
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A DRAGON FROM FISH 
 
 “A guerrilla force should be amongst the people like fish in water.”1 In this 
metaphor, Mao Zedong elucidated the nature of guerrillas originating from and finding their 
home amongst the masses. Making their way midst the people, guerrillas found their 
supplies, support and sanctuaries from better equipped, better trained, and better disciplined 
regular troops who, on a one-to-one and face-to-face battlefield easily overcame the 
unconventional guerrilla. These amateur soldiers—be they peasants with no crops to harvest, 
children with no parents, or bereaved loved ones left after the deaths of their family—were 
driven to violence as a means to generate political change when no other options appeared 
viable; they turned to violence to end violence. Over time in the practice of war, however, 
they underwent a myriad of changes and evolved into disciplined soldiers. Though they 
lacked the trappings of a professional force such as uniforms, grade and unit insignia, regular 
supplies and sufficient food, their struggles most certainly hardened them to handle the most 
brutal and horrific of human experiences. With time, as Mao observed, “There is no profound 
difference between the farmer and the soldier...and after you have fought several times 
valiantly and aggressively, you may become a leader of troops, and there will be many well-
known regular soldiers who will not be your peers.”2  
 Beyond this, however, swims a subtle link to the traditional Chinese folk tale of the 
carp that swam upriver. In this tale, a carp attempted to swim upstream in the Yellow River 
in order to reach the Dragon’s Gate. Along the journey, the small carp swam his hardest 
                                                          
1 Mao, Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2000), 93. 
2 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 73. 
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against the torrents currents and raging floodwaters. The fish could not totally escape the 
water so long as it remained an aquatic animal, as the fluid provided its nourishment.  It 
continued forward, struggling continually. His little orange and white fins exhausted, he 
continued to swim along. At the end of his journey, the carp swayed up to the infamous 
Golden Gate, the entryway to the Jade Emperor’s Court and the Heavenly Palace. With his 
last measure of strength, the carp leapt from the deluge and over the gate. Instead of landing 
in the water on the other side, however, the carp found himself suspended in the air, his form 
changed from a tiny, golden fish to a mighty dragon. 
 This carp-turned-dragon, though far from what Mao described as the relationship 
between guerrillas and the people, is an apt allegory for the development of his model of 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare and the ascendancy of China during the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries. Furthermore, the contrast between Mao’s insistence that the water was the 
haven for the fish, and the symbol of hardship and adversity found in the water of the carp, 
both are equally the case for guerrillas. When examined in terms of historical progression 
through periods of theory, application, refinement and adaptation, the fledgling 
Revolutionary Army-turned-People’s Liberation Army represents the carp-turned-dragon, 
Mao’s model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare represents the carp’s strategy to swim against 
the current. The struggles of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the standing of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) against a myriad of challenges including outside and 
inside-supported imperialist incursions, perceived threats from the United States and United 
Nations (US-UN), and well as internal challenges such as a primarily agrarian economy and 
little to no industrial capability acted as the water in and against which the fish swam.   
3 
 Divided into six periods, a development of this strategy manifested from a seed based 
in traditional culture and literature through to fruition as a model applied to anti-
industrialized warfare during the twentieth century, adapted as necessary, and exported 
across Asia during the collapse of the Age of Imperialism.  To begin, during Mao’s 
childhood, he received influence from traditional Chinese history and literature in his days in 
primary school, especially from Romance of the Three Kingdoms and The Water Margin 
shaped his world view.3 According to Mao’s recollections later in life,  
I have never attended any military school. Nor have I read a book on military 
strategy. People say I relied on “Romance of Three Kingdoms” and “Military Strategy 
of [Sunzi]” for my military campaigns. I said that I had never read “Military Strategy 
of [Sunzi].” Yes, I have read “Romance of Three Kingdoms.4 
 
As a youth and student working in the Beijing University library, between 1911 and 1931, 
Mao developed a political awareness of Communism and sought to adapt European political 
theory to the unique circumstances of China.  Between 1931-1945 Mao’s theories on 
warfare, especially on asymmetric or guerrilla warfare crystalized during his experiences 
fighting industrialized, imperialist forces, during this period Mao wrote and published 
extensively on the subject of military thought and theory.   
With the outbreak of conflict between the Chinese Communists and the Guomindang 
(GMD) and later the imperial Japanese, Mao refined his theories. Though the completion of 
                                                          
3 Tien, Chen-ya, Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern (New York: Mosaic Press, 
1992), 211. Tien mentions Mao’s interest in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms and The 
Water Margin. Edward E. Rice, Mao’s Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974). 
7.  “There is no question but what Romance of the Three Kingdoms exerted a profound and 
lasting influence upon Mao [Zedong].”3 
4 “Dialogues with Responsible Persons of the Capital Red Guards Congress, July 28, 1968,” 
Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought, Red Guards Publication, Marxist Internet Archive, 
accessed August 19, 2013. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-
works/volume-9/mswv9_81.htm. 
4 
the Chinese Civil War in 1949 often marks the conclusion of the development of Mao’s 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare model, to apply such a mark divests the study of one of the 
most important eras of development.  From 1949, Mao’s model of revolutionary guerrilla 
warfare both underwent its greatest challenge and witnessed its greatest measure of the 
importance of this theory as a means to develop the influence of the PRC as a central power 
in Asia.  The first important period of the extended timeline occurred during the Korean War 
as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), on the one hand, experienced its own change from a 
guerrilla force into a regular army.  On the other hand, it had to retain many of the strategies 
used in guerrilla warfare, especially when fighting in Korea.  Though there the soldiers took 
on the official status of Chinese People’s Volunteer Forces (CPVF), they still retained all of 
their original elements of being PLA troops including equipment, experience, and force 
organization—only insignia of the PRC and PLA did they not wear.  These necessary 
adaptations created the greatest opportunities to develop revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a 
truly viable challenge to the supposed Western military superiority, as demonstrated by the 
lengthy stalemate at the 38th Parallel.  For all of the United States forgetfulness of the Korean 
War, Vietnam stands as a haunting reminder of the dangers of underestimating proxy 
conflicts and the viability of unconventional forces. In China, however, the Korean War still 
stands as the hallmark conflict to Resist American Aggression. One final period served as a 
highlight of the success of this strategy and with it a means for China to exert influence again 
over China occurred between 1955-1970 when Chinese advisors assisted the efforts of the 
North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong.5 With little effort, one may see the application 
                                                          
5 Merle L. Pribbenow, trans., Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army 
of Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 55, and Qiang Zhai, 
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of Mao’s model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare applied to the structuring and organization 
of the revolutionary forces of Vietnam. While both of these eras stand as important and rich 
grounds for historians to examine in an effort to understand the sources of human conflict, 
the importance of understanding cross-cultural communication, and being aware of a variety 
of thought and theory approaches to conflict and diplomacy, this work focuses on the period 
between 1950-1953 highlighting the ultimate stage of the PLA as a revolutionary guerrilla 
force as it transitioned to a conventional force while attempting to wrestle influence in the 
region from the US.  To understand how the dragon of the PRC came from humble 
beginnings as guerrilla’s amongst fish, readers must understand how Mao’s military theories 
continued in books translated into the actions of boots on the ground. 
The question that spawned the seed of this thesis arose as a seemingly simple enough 
examination: why did Mao Zedong direct the CPVF in a method similar to his model of 
guerrilla warfare? From this deceptively simple question (an àpropos situation, considering 
the topic of study) arose a myriad of further avenues of investigation necessary to examine in 
order to gain a better—if only slightly—grasp on Mao’s military thought and theory. Some 
of the most important questions to blossom forth included, where do Mao’s military writings 
fit with the larger military-philosophical literary tradition of China? How did traditional 
Chinese military methods manifest in Mao’s approaches to war? Why did Mao alter his 
model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in Korea from what gained him success against the 
Japanese? To what extent did anti-imperialism influence Mao’s military planning? Why did 
Mao emphasize the importance of people and individual heroism at the expense of 
technology and industry? Did Mao gain parity because the US mismanaged the conflict or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 
1950-1954,” Journal of Military History vol. 57, no. 4 (Oct., 1993): 689-715. 
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did Mao’s model truly prove a viable alternative approach to conflict? This work analyses 
Mao Zedong’s military thought and theory of revolutionary guerrilla warfare from three 
important perspectives. First, this work examines the influences of classical Chinese military 
philosophy upon Mao as well as the placement of his works within the larger military-
philosophical literary tradition of China. Second, this work examines the particulars of Mao’s 
military theories of guerrilla warfare as a pragmatic and efficacious means to an end—the 
forced, violent removal of foreign (id est powers Mao described as imperialist) in Asia. 
Ultimately, this work argues that Mao’s military theories, based in applicable traditional 
philosophies with modifications as necessary based on situational demands created favorable 
circumstances from the limited resources and experiences available to Chinese forces while 
at the same time turned the supposed strengths of industrialization and popular opinion 
against oppositional forces. Third, this work deviates from the standard English language 
interpretation of the Korean War of “lessons learned” historiography that focused on the 
shortcomings of United States policy makers and military planners and instead examines a 
“lessons taught” approach that examined the strengths of Mao’s military model that, in short, 
created a parity of force in Korea and how these lessons apply in current conflicts based on 
similar principles of asymmetrical warfare.  
Methodologies and sources limit the English language historiography of the CPVF in 
the Korean War. From the scholarly works published on the Korean War, readers may 
extrapolate a handful of methodologies of the CPVF in the conflict: American Defeatist; 
Anti-Technologist; Great Man Mao; Social History of the CPVF; and CPVF in transition. 
Even with so many approaches to the study of the CPVF in Korea, the vast majority of works 
that relate to the subject examine questions related to the US-UN forces, or the international 
7 
diplomatic history. Sources concerned with the US-UN examine their quality of preparedness 
and the factors that forced the West into a stalemate with the CPVF and Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) forces. Those authors that examine the role of China in the war, 
specifically the PRC, Beijing, and Mao Zedong, approach the topic from a diplomatic and 
political history and pay little attention to issues of the CPVF. These topics included the 
implementation of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in the conflict, or why the CPVF, and by 
extension the PRC, was able to successfully force the US-UN. 
Some historians had access to some Chinese sources, but these proved of limited 
usefulness. Newspapers, testimonies of captured CPVF soldiers, and propaganda, for 
example, comprised the core of early primary Chinese language sources available to 
historians. In both cases, political rhetoric of the time, both for the CCP or against it, 
inundated these works and of course colored the information therein as of inadequate value. 
Even following Deng Xiaoping’s “opening to the outside world” programs of the late 
twentieth century, there remained numerous difficulties in accessing useful source material. 
These include stringent censorship and editing policies for works that may be contrary to 
CCP policies, travel restrictions, and lack of funding to conduct research. In his lecture-
turned-article, “Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China’s ‘New Cold War’ Documentation,” 
Chen Jian described the continuing difficulty of finding primary sources in China, largely 
because of access to public circulation works and inner circulation works where the former 
many have access to and the latter only those with official capacities may access.6  
                                                          
6 Chen, Jian, “Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China’s ‘New Cold War’ Documentation,” 
(paper presented at Conference on the Power of Free Inquiry and Cold War International 
History, Session IV, September 25-26, 1998, National Archives at College Park, Maryland). 
http://www.archives.org/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/conference-jian.html 
8 
Restrictions on the publication of party leaders’ writings lessened beginning in the 
1980s and the number of works by influential PRC leaders increases yearly. In an article 
released by News China in 2013, entitled “Official Literature,” the authors examined the 
changing nature of published works by persons of import in recent history. In eras before, 
strict editing of works and separation of texts into internal and general circulation copies kept 
a strict control of literature. These writings, however, gradually changed in terms of style and 
number. Newer works contained more popular appeals with increased informal form of 
presentation and less political theory and official reports.7 This should not suggest that 
printing in China reflects—indeed, it does not even approach—a sense of a free press, as all 
works still must undergo strict review and editing procedures. According to Feng Shuanqing 
and Min Jie, “From gardening manuals to sci-fi novels, all books in China are subject to the 
approval of censors, and writings by national leaders are far from safe from the red pen.”8 
While this certainly does not reflect an ease of access to printed materials that Westerners 
enjoy, these changes in printing and publishing procedures contain glimmers of hopeful 
change for future researchers. 
These complexities may no longer have as quite a direct effect on restricting access to 
sources beyond the restrictions of publishers. Chen provided an anecdote of receiving a 
mysterious package with an inner circulation copy of Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the 
Formation of the People’s Republic of China.9 Despite this Cold War era tone of a spy movie 
complete with informants and secret documents, a key issue remained unknown to the 
readers regarding censorship at the post office. According to Jyrki Kallio, a Chinese policy 
                                                          
7 Feng, Shuangqing and Min, Jie, “Official Literature,” News China vol. 059 (July 2013), 30. 
8 Feng and Min, “Official Literature,” 31. 
9 Feng and Min, “Official Literature,” 31. 
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specialist with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, regulation of documents and 
materials for shipping abroad occurred at the post office level where officials open boxes, 
examined the contents, resealed the parcels, and sent them along if allowable. In most 
circumstances, however, the average postal worker either did not possess knowledge of the 
circulation policies of the CCP or generally concluded because of the high level of certain 
works that the person in possession had permission to possess these texts. 10  
To develop a sufficient qualitative analytical based for this study, the author drew 
from Mao’s military writings, especially the Selected Writings series as well as accounts 
from Chinese soldiers, military leaders, and classical treatises on Chinese military thought 
and theory. Because of the voluminous scope of the topics included in the broad and 
overarching scopes of this work, the author chose to use the Korean War as a case study. 
First, this conflict represented the heights of the development and refinement of 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a method to combat industrialized, Western powers in 
Asia. In this conflict, the CPVF participated actively (and quite dominantly compared to their 
DPRK counterparts), where their previous experiences combating the Japanese as well as 
familiarity with Mao military thought carried into their roles in Korea. Furthermore, the 
oppositional force, primarily US, provided a meaningful assessment in terms of asymmetrical 
warfare and the aforementioned “lessons taught” approach for current and future conflicts 
wherein the US may find itself entangled with a persistent, un-industrialized, insurgency, or 
for the sake of gaining insights into Chinese military thought—something that continues to 
demonstrate significant influence from both the classical writers and Mao himself.  
                                                          
10 Interview, Jyrki Kallio, Chinese foreign policy expert, Finish Institute of International 
Affairs, July7, 2013. 
10 
These may be the most important contributions of this work to the study of history, 
especially with regards to understanding sources of, approaches to, and solutions for conflict. 
To begin with, when examined from the Chinese perspective, the Korean War shifts from a 
“forgotten war” of inappropriate preparations to one of remarkable note wherein an agrarian 
and semi-colonial state arose from under the tyranny of feudalism, colonialism, and 
imperialism, only to immediately venture into conflicts against the most developed and 
capable military power of the time.  What’s more, despite this military-industrial disparity, 
the CPVF reached a military parity with the US-UN forces, reinforcing the cliché adage to 
not underestimate one’s opponent.  From this “lessons taught” approach, industrialized 
powers should gain insights into the potential threats of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and 
be wary of the comforting temptation to rely on technological determinism as the most 
important factor when assessing military capability.  This work also carries import as a 
“lessons learned” approach in that it highlights how pragmatism and adaptability, when used 
appropriately with traditional theories, directed Mao’s philosophies more than single-minded 
adherence to principles.  Despite these ominous components, this work should not be read as 
a statement of the inevitability of conflict between the US and the PRC. Neither should this 
work be read as a manual of sorts to direct conflict. Instead, the greatest import of this work 
is the lessons learned and taught from conflict as a means to prevent future bloodshed and 
suffering. 
The carp and the Dragon Gate mentioned in the Introduction of this work continue to 
play an important role as a metaphor in Chinese society. When young people succeed in a 
particularly harrowing endeavor—most commonly academic exams—their communities 
announce their passing of the Dragon Gate. In many ways, this work represents the author’s 
11 
journey up stream towards his own Dragon Gate. This gate, however, resides some distance 
yet away. Nevertheless, the progress made on this leg of the journey happened only because 
of the persistent mentorship and guidance of those mentioned throughout this work. Yet, 
there exists not enough praise in any and all languages to express an adequate measure of 
gratitude. Perhaps then, the best available means to articulate this feeling comes from the 
closing remarks of Tian Chenshan at the 2013 Institute of Chinese Culture and Cross-
Cultural Communication, Beijing, “If you’re satisfied with my response that is because I had 
a good teacher. If you’re not satisfied with my response, it is because I’m not a good 
student.”11 No better words come to this author after exhausting his efforts to reflect 
honorably in his scholarship upon his mentors, teachers, and peers. 
 
 





                                                          
11 Tian, Chenshan, “Transcendentalism and Dualism in Western Thinkers,” lecture presented 
at Institute of Chinese Culture and Cross Cultural Communication, Beijing, PRC, July 7-
August 3, 2013.  
12 L. Newton Hayes, The Chinese Dragon (Commercials Press Limited: Shanghai, 1923), 18. 
Unfortunately, this author had not the opportunity to visit the Dragon Gate in Nanjing during 
his study tour, July 4-August 5, 2013. As such, this image must suffice. If nothing else, the 
author hopes readers will appreciate the delicate artistry and successful capturing of the 
motion and transformation in the piece. 
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APPROACHES AND SOURCES 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CPVF IN KOREA 
 
Approaches and sources limit the English language historiography of the Chinese 
People’s Volunteers (CPVF) in the Korean War. Amongst the scholarly works produced on 
the Korean War, readers may extrapolate a handful of methodologies of the CPVF in the 
conflict: American Defeatist; Anti-Technologist; Great Man Mao; Social History of the 
CPVF; and CPVF in transition. Even with so many approaches to the study of the CPVF in 
Korea, the vast majority of works on the subject examine questions related to the United 
States and United Nations (US-UN) forces or the international diplomatic history. Sources 
concerned with the US-UN examine their quality of preparedness and the factors that forced 
them into a stalemate with the CPVF and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
forces. Those authors that examine the role of China in the war, specifically the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), Beijing, and Mao Zedong, approach the topic from a diplomatic 
and political history and pay little attention to issues of the CPVF such as the implementation 
of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in the conflict or why the CPVF, and by extension the 
PRC, was able to successfully force the US-UN, to a stalemate after merely a year as a state.  
Compiling the historiography of the CPVF, as printed in English language sources, is 
essential to understanding a number of historiographical trends, as well as general trends in 
military professional-education culture. First, the English language sources, dominated by 
US-UN authors, focus on the lessons learned aspects such as “why was the US-UN 
defeated?” or “how was it brought to stalemate by the CPVF?” These sources seldom if ever 
overtly raise the possibility of a more challenging—perhaps even superior—CPVF force. 
Traditional US interpretations of China, born from two-hundred years of colonial division 
13 
and suppression of China by Western powers, hold that China was politically and militarily 
weak and culturally backward. This Western-centric interpretation fuels the search for the 
causes of the stalemate within the Western forces instead of looking outwardly to the abilities 
of the CPVF. Furthermore, histories that focus on, written or funded by US interests are a 
significant portion of those available in English. Unfortunately, these works often lack a 
sense of the grand scale of China’s rich, diverse, and lengthy military tradition that extends 
back nearly 2,200 years. This academic shortsightedness persists because of a combination of 
post 1800 exchanges between the US and China, where the former enjoyed significant 
imperial pressure over the later, and the post-World War II euphoria and a sense of 
indomitability of the US.13 For example, the US was accustomed to knowing only a relatively 
military weak China, beginning with the later stages of the Qing (Opium Wars and Boxer 
Rebellion), the struggles of the Guomindang (GMD) and CCP against the imperial Japanese, 
and the mismanagement of the GMD. Furthermore, the Allied defeat of Japan, a modern, 
Western-modeled military force, and subsequent occupation of Japan were reminiscent of 
“imperial” occupation in Asia.14 Thus, US examinations of the Korean War sought to explain 
the US parity and defeat in terms of self-created causes because of no direct experience with 
a militarily competitive China. Though such examinations are useful in terms of preparing 
                                                          
13 This last element, the US victory over Japan, often plays a role in the interpretations of the 
conflict between the US-UN and the CPVF. Many sources, especially English language 
works, cite the Korean War as the first engagement of the PRC against a modern 
industrialized force. While the imperial Japanese forced lacked the same scale of industrial 
capacity as the US, it was a modern, industrialized force capable of competitive force 
projection at the height of the Second World War. Furthermore, the imperial Japanese 
command based their force organizations on Western models. 
14 Thomas E. Hanson, Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 14. 
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for the next war by fighting the previous war—to be cliché—such self-criticism did little to 
prepare the US for future conflicts in the region or small wars across the globe.  
This scholarship lacks investigations of a significant question: why and how did the 
CPVF overcome and create a parity of force and a stalemate with the US-UN? To understand 
the significance of this lack of an examination, it is essential to examine specifics related to 
the prevailing Western—especially United States—interpretations of China and comparisons 
between US and PRC military models. Conversely, the Chinese successfully spread their 
model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet 
Cong (VC). This, then, if there is a distinction between Eastern and Western military 
traditions demonstrates that the Western tradition found quite a bit of difficulty coping with 
the Eastern tradition, both in terms of its ancient roots and modern iterations throughout 
much of the mid-twentieth century. These arguments, though useful as lessons learned 
history, fail to consider the possibility that the CPVF and their doctrine of revolutionary 
guerrilla warfare provided a greater challenge than the US-UN could, against their previous 
experiences, successfully overcome, as this work attempts to argue. 
In addition to the ideological limitations of early works, access to quality and diverse 
primary sources further restrained the abilities of historians to study the CPVF in the Korean 
War. Earlier historians relied on limited English language sources such as political and 
diplomatic correspondences, intelligence assessments, after action reports, and accounts of 
battle participants. The preponderance of diplomatic correspondence and intelligence 
estimates meant that many of the earliest histories focused on the diplomatic and political 
aspects of the conflict, such as the relations between the Soviet Union, PRC, and DPRK 
while unfortunately prevented these works from examining the military aspects in detail. 
15 
Intelligence assessments and after-action reports, while useful to compose strategic and 
operational histories in broad terms lacked valuable data from the CPVF to verify the specific 
units, troop numbers, doctrine influences, and other details otherwise available only in 
Chinese language sources. Memoirs and testimonies from soldiers served to fill in tactical 
elements of the histories, but possessed a set of limiting factors as well. To being with, many 
memoirs and testimonies collected after action suffered from the fog of war, and in some 
cases the fog of time as interviewers, authors, and historians did not collect these works until 
many years after the conclusion of the Korean War. Furthermore, the intense political climate 
of the Cold War carried over into the memories of the participants—a detail that historians 
must bear in mind when studying such accounts. 
Early historians had access to some Chinese sources, but these offered limited 
usefulness. Newspapers and propaganda, for example, comprised the core of early primary 
Chinese language sources available to historians, with some limited access to translated 
testimonies of captured CPVF soldiers. In both cases, political rhetoric of the time, both for 
the CCP or against it, inundated these works and of course colored the information therein as 
of inadequate value. Even following Deng Xiaoping’s “opening to the outside world” 
programs of the late twentieth century, there remained numerous difficulties in accessing 
useful source material. These include stringent censorship and editing policies for works that 
may be contrary to CCP policies, travel restrictions, and lack of funding to conduct research. 
In his lecture-turned-article, “Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China’s ‘New Cold War’ 
Documentation,” Chen Jian described the continuing difficulty of finding primary sources in 
China, largely because of access to public circulation works and inner circulation works 
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where the former many have access to and the latter only those with official capacities may 
access.15  
These complexities may no longer have as quite a direct effect on restricting access to 
sources beyond the restrictions of publishers. Chen provided an anecdote of receiving a 
mysterious package with an inner circulation copy of Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the 
Formation of the People’s Republic of China.16 Despite this Cold War era tone of a spy 
movie complete with informants and secret documents, a key issue remained unknown to the 
readers regarding censorship at the post office. According to Jyrki Kallio, a Chinese policy 
specialist with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, regulation of documents and 
materials for shipping abroad occurred at the post office level where officials open boxes, 
examined the contents, resealed the parcels, and sent them along if allowable. In most 
circumstances, however, the average postal worker either did not possess knowledge of the 
circulation policies of the CCP or generally concluded because of the high level of certain 
works that the person in possession had permission to possess these texts. 17  
Historians generally divide the chronology of the conflict into two distinct periods.18 
Millett and Cummings established the framework that the majority of later historians adopted 
in their interpretations, and is so used in this examination. The first period of the conflict 
occurred when hostilities broke out between the US-UN, including the ROK, against the 
DPRK. The second period occurred when the CPVF entered the conflict in October of 1950. 
                                                          
15 Chen, Jian, “Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China’s ‘New Cold War’ Documentation,” 
(paper presented at Conference on the Power of Free Inquiry and Cold War International 
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18 Hanson, Combat Ready? 10. 
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Understanding this division of events and the reasons behind this division is essential to 
understand the development of the historiographical schools of the study of the Korean War, 
especially the military history of the CPVF in the Korean War. First, the entry of the CPVF 
into the conflict in October 1950 introduced fundamental differences in manpower including 
differences in Communist force sizes and troop quality, tactics (id est, Revolutionary 
Guerrilla Warfare, the focus of research to which this historiography pertains), equipment, 
training, and logistics.19 In addition to these changes, the CPVF also possessed a number of 
experiences that the DPRK lacked, such as the continuous combat experience gained since 
1937 against the Imperial Japan (though there were elements of the DPRK who fought in the 
Red Army of the CCP against Imperial Japan who, at the onset of the first phase of the 
Korean War, returned to North Korea to assist their countrymen) through the end of the war 
in 1945, and further combat experience against the GMD from 1945 through 1949.  
One of the key issues of common study introduced by the intervention of the CPVF in 
the Korean War was the doctrinal struggle of the US-UN to fight a limited war successfully. 
Allen S. Whiting points out, and Reeses examines in detail, that the Korean War, and 
especially the entry of the CPVF, raised a number of questions such as how to address 
limited wars in the nuclear age. He added that the entry of the CPVF and the foci of the US-
UN on the “lessons learned” aspects—as in to who should the blame fall for the “setbacks” 
of the UN—reduced the critical inquiry paid to this topic.20 This approach forms one of the 
largest schools of historical inquiry of the Korean War, and relates closely to the Western-
centric, Western-Military Superiority interpretation of military history, because historians 
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(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), 168. 
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find the sources for the US-UN “setbacks” not in the abilities of the CPVF but in the faults of 
the US-UN.21 There is little conflict in the major theses of this approach, is in part because 
many proponents of this method of examination base their works either US-UN documents 
(including memoirs) or a handful of early works on the subject.  
Whiting’s China Crosses the Yalu is one of the most frequently cited references 
regarding the CPVF in the Korean War. While useful, this work has several limitations, 
primarily that much of the Chinese language sources included newspaper articles and CCP 
propaganda. So often cited, this work is, in the words of Stueck, “the traditional view” of 
English language authors on the PRC and CPVF in the Korean War.22 Among others, this 
work forms the foundation of related studies in LeFeber’s America, Russia, and the Cold 
War, 1945-2006 and Spence’s The Search for Modern China. As a “lesson’s learned” 
approach, Whiting warns US policy makers and strategic planners that keen cultural 
awareness, especially in the realms of history, philosophy, and language, proved essential in 
future international relations in order to prevent such conflicts. Furthermore, Whiting 
reminds readers that, though the US possesses nuclear capabilities, there are other forms of 
conflict for it to maintain preparedness and readiness to conduct. Because of the emphasis of 
the lessons learned approach of Whiting’s work, and the continued reliance upon it as a 
foundation of other works, this approach continues to set firmly into place the study of the 
Korean War as an example of how a modern, Western army should not fight a war, and it 
will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future.  
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Since the time of Whiting’s work, other historians addressed the lessons learned 
approach. Thomas E. Hanson’s Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the 
Korean War, addresses the issue of the lessons learned approach as a collection of 
operational, doctrinal, and administrative lessons for military planners in an attempt to 
overcome the view that the Eight Army was unprepared for the Korean War. His argument 
holds that the Eighth Army gained experiences in combat from World War II that made it a 
competent fighting force for the time, but it lacked up-to-date equipment to combat the 
communist offensive. Though this work does not address the quality of the CPVF, the 
argument implies that the communist forces were a competitive challenge to the militarily 
superior Western forces.  
Attached to the lessons learned approach is the American-defeatists approach that 
argues the US-UN, especially the latter, were bound for defeat long before the conflict began. 
The sources of this defeat, however, resided not in the CPVF or other communist forces, but 
rather Washington’s mismanagement of the Korean War. T.R. Fehrenbach, from his 
conclusion “Lessons,” in This Kind of War, posits “There was little in [the Korean War], 
from near-disastrous beginning to honorable but frustrating end, that appealed to American 
sensibilities. Because they cannot look back on it with any sense of satisfaction, of even the 
haunted pride that a defeated nation sometimes find, American prefer not to look back at 
all.”23 Though this work laid the groundwork for most early studies of the Korean War, and it 
referenced outright an American defeat, it focused on the “unpreparedness” of the US-UN 
rather than the abilities of the CPVF. This conclusion sums up the predominant popular 
                                                          
23 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2008), 452. 
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sentiment of the US, in both civilian and military realms, of the Korean War—a foreign 
action, in a foreign land, that had little worth remembering. 
The final component of the lessons learned approach is the technological approach 
that relates closely to the American-defeatist interpretation. Whiting hints at this school with 
his warnings that nuclear weapons capabilities restricted the US ability to respond to limited 
wars, though this is only a portion of his larger analysis. Hanson also carries forth some of 
this approach when comparing the quality of equipment issued to the Eighth Army on the eve 
of the Korean War. That said these two are only two of the contributors to this approach. 
Marshall, as quoted in Hanson, discusses the “contemporary ‘overemphasis on technology’” 
by the US during the early Cold War as a significantly limiting factor of the US-UN to 
combat the CPVF.24 The fact, however, that this approach even exists provides credence to 
Mao and the CMC’s decisions to use revolutionary guerrilla warfare in Korea as it outlines 
the specific limitations of the US-UN reliance’s on technology rather than the abilities of 
soldiers. According to Mao, “the outcome of war is decided by the people, not by one or two 
new weapons.”25 Due to the relatively minimal industrial development of the PRC at the time 
of the Korean War, there was not much choice in the matter of whether or not to rely more on 
either people or machines. This emphasis on superiority of manpower over technology, was 
essential to overcoming any disparity of arms.26  
As with many of the subsequent works on the Korean War, Whiting sets the tone for 
studies that explicitly address the roles of the CPVF. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
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Union scholarship on the CPVF witnessed a dramatic increase. This altered political climate 
allowed thousands of documents of the diplomatic and military exchanges between the 
Soviet Union, PRC, and DPRK, previously held tightly behind the Iron Curtain, to become 
available to a new generation of historians.27 Furthermore, improved political ties between 
the PRC and US increased in the exchange of academics and research between the two. Since 
these phenomenal events, collections and initiatives such as the Cold War International 
History Project, Truman Library, Military History Center, The Cold War Museum, and 
others have initiatives to collect and translate an immense body of sources related to the 
Korean War, and especially the CPVF. That said there remain many difficulties in accessing 
Chinese sources directly. These include stringent censorship and editing policies for works 
that may be contrary to CCP policies, travel restrictions, and a lack of funding to conduct 
research. Because of these and other limitations, there is still much in Chinese archives that 
remains to be seen.  
Scholarly research examining the PRC and CPVF address the Korean War from the 
perspectives of major-player/great man history with an emphasis on Mao Zedong, the 
institutional history of the CPVF and the CPVF as a social project, the CPVF in transition, 
and the Korean War as an attempt to reestablish Chinese hegemony in Asia interpretation. 
Despite the recurrence of the CPVF in these theses, the majority of works do not address, at 
length, the CPVF itself. Rather, they examine the CPVF as a portion of the larger military 
organization of the PLA, and then expand the study into one of the change and continuity of 
the PLA over time.  
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The largest body of work on the role of China in the Korean War contains the studies 
of the major players, specifically Mao, in the planning, preparation, entrance, and campaigns 
of the Korean War. These works present Mao as the orchestrator of the CPVF’s intervention 
in Korea, though whether he acted of his own accord or under the guidance of the Soviet 
Union is a point of contention. Nevertheless, what historians cannot argue is the extent to 
which Mao managed the affairs of the war from Beijing, going so far as to determine the 
timing of each of the CPVF’s offensives.  
Under the Mao as the orchestrator of the CPVF campaign school is an analysis of his 
model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Such an approach takes on two distinct dimensions: 
first, the usage of his doctrinal advancements developed during the previous decades as 
guiding principles; second, his amendments and alterations to these models during the 
Korean War. In both cases, Mao’s thoughts and theories dominated the philosophies held by 
the Chinese military and political entities. The written works of Mao, most notably his 
military essays and the famous Quotations from Chairman Mao formed the basis of the 
written doctrine of these elements. Mao history, though valuable because of his direction of 
the Korean campaigns, reduces the significance of other important players such as Peng 
(perhaps one of the long-time victims of Korea and the political climate of the twentieth 
century), Nie, and others who, despite their efforts in Korea, were overcome by the Maoist 
cult of personality of the twentieth century.28 
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At the opposite end of the social spectrum from the major-player/great man history of 
the Korean War is the examination of the CPVF and social history. This relatively new 
interpretation is, on the one hand growing quickly, and on the other hand has only a limited 
time to do so. The growing interests in social history, especially the antithesis of the major-
player/great man history, encouraged the development in the latter twentieth and early 
twenty-first century. These works focus on the experiences of combat soldiers in Korea in an 
effort to clear the fog of war from the commanders’ maps and provide readers accounts of the 
war in the trenches from a bottom up approach. Social histories also demonstrate that soldiers 
from both the US-UN and the communist forces suffered the horrors of war in much the 
same ways. As intellectual histories, these personal accounts from participating belligerents 
are essential to understanding how Mao’s model of Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare 
manifested at a variety of levels, not merely as a theory dictated from Beijing and contained 
in the pages of a little red book, but also as a means to an end. Valuable and worthy of 
increased scholarship as they are, there are important limitations to the Chinese accounts, 
according to Xiaobing Li, because the majority of literate personnel in the CPVF were 
officers.29 Furthermore, the availability of Korean War veterans, whether from north or south 
of the 38th Parallel, diminishes with each passing day, reducing the number of participants 
available for interviews. Thus, extending the study of the CPVF in the Korean War to the 
lowest echelons of command may be an impossible task.  
Relating to the social history studies of the CPVF in Korea is the examination of the 
Korean War as a time of transition for the PLA, wherein the role of the CPVF is a prime 
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29 Li, Voices, xiv. 
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illustration of this period of transition. These arguments focus on the changes from a peasant 
guerrilla army, such as the early Red Army/PLA that fought the imperial Japanese forces and 
later the GMD, to a conventional force capable of mounting noteworthy resistance against 
the premier Western forces of the day. This change, especially during the Korean War, 
occurred during a time of when the CPVF (and by extension, PLA) recognized the strengths 
and limitations of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and pushed to modernize.30 This change 
was not one that occurred immediately with the establishment of the PRC. Instead, the 
Korean War provided for the PLA, through the CPVF, an opportunity to adjust Maoist 
Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare until the PLA could produce forces that were more modern.  
There is, however, division amongst historians as to when and how the PLA would 
modernize. Bruce A. Ellerman, for example, argues that the PLA, specifically Peng Dehuai, 
wanted the PLA to be more modern, mobile army.31 While this may have been a long-term 
objective for Peng, evidence from his memoirs stated that he desired a prolonged, guerrilla 
style war to overcome the US-UN, though following the war he did encourage more strongly 
the rapid modernization of the PLA.32 Furthermore, the choice to use revolutionary guerrilla 
warfare was a conscious decision on the part of Beijing at the outset of the war. According to 
Peng, “If the Americans decided to fight against us, a quick war would be favorable to them, 
but a protracted one to us; regular warfare would be favorable to them but the methods [of 
revolutionary guerrilla war] that we had used to deal with the Japanese would be favorable to 
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us.”33 While the exact nature of the war changed throughout the course of the Korean War, 
this is not so far out of the overall Chinese model of warfare that advocates adaptability to 
conflict. Mao’s “underground Great Wall” of tunnels and trenches did limit the 
maneuverability of the CPVF as the similar earthworks limited the US-UN forces.34 
Furthermore, considering that one of the precepts of Mao’s model of revolutionary guerrilla 
warfare was the idea of trading space for time, the construction of the “underground Great 
Wall” maximized the amount of time traded for very limited gains in space around the 38th 
parallel. This is not to suggest that this adaptation was the ideal evolution of revolutionary 
guerrilla warfare in Korea, as Wortzel notes that Peng advised Mao that the CPVF was 
unaccustomed to trench warfare.35 
It is important to note that, while the CPVF gained parity with the US-UN and 
prevented the US-UN from forcibly reuniting Korea, it came at an extreme cost in terms of 
human life. This is perhaps one of the most important indicators that this was a period of 
change for the CPVF. Revolutionary guerrilla warfare was still a useful doctrine to overcome 
Western forces especially in the absence of industry, mechanized and air forces. It was not, 
however, a doctrine that the CPVF could continuously implement against the US-UN or 
similar hostile powers.  
The last major examination of the CPVF in the Korean War addresses the issues of 
history as propaganda. This perspective, however, has several layers to it. First and most 
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familiar to readers, is the idea that Korean War is the “Forgotten War” in the US. As alluded 
to earlier, what is not said about the Korean War in the US is just as important as what is 
said. Perhaps this is because few cultures want to remember their almost victories, ties, and 
defeats. It is easier to accept these outcomes when cultures can look back and say “we were 
not prepared,” rather than admitting that the opposition was better prepared than anticipated. 
Perhaps, in a reversal of interpretations, this is why in the PRC the Korean War is one of the 
most important markers of Chinese military prowess of the twentieth century because a 
largely agrarian, peasant, guerrilla army, with limited industrial capacity, was able to bring 
the premier military of the West to a stalemate. 
As noted, one of the most significant shortcomings of the English language research 
is the limited availability of Chinese language sources. This limit originates from a variety of 
causes, chiefly the limited political and academic interactions between the PRC and US 
during the mid-twentieth century and a lack of declassified military documents from both 
sides in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century. Improved relations between 
the US and PRC, has made it easier for academics from both countries to exchange sources 
and research in the hope of fostering increased understanding. Furthermore, the 
declassification of documents from the Cold War, historians will continue to produce better 
research on the Korean War. 
Another major question that begs for an answer: who was more an advocate of 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare in Korea: Mao, Peng, Nie, another party, or a combination of 
these leaders? As the literature stands, much focuses on the role of Mao as the orchestrator of 
the campaigns in Korea. This interpretation is not without merit, however, as Mao was the 
source of the doctrine used in the conflict. Furthermore, he instructed Peng when and how to 
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launch the campaigns—for better or worse. The question of whether Mao was the strongest 
advocate for revolutionary guerrilla warfare during the Korean War arose from sources that 
indicated Peng argued for a withdraw to lure the US-UN forces north of the 38th parallel. 
Sources available from Peng and Nie, however, became known more recently to allow 
historians to examine this picture. Considering, however, that most of these sources are still 
carefully examined by the Chinese government for details that put the Party in a negative 
light, and connected with this too (this author suspects) are documents that put Mao in a 
negative light, it may be some time before historians can have a more complete picture of the 
role of Peng and Nie, and others, in the Korean War. 
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MAO’S PLACE IN HISTORY 
THE MILITARY-PHILOSOPHICAL LITERARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF MAO ZEDONG 
 
The spilled ink, shredded trees, and split bamboo slivers that form the body of 
literature on the theory and practice of warfare record the insights of past generations into 
one of the most harrowing and trying elements of the human experience. Within this genre of 
literature, China possesses one of the richest continuous literary histories with some of the 
oldest received military texts the world over. The age of the Classical Chinese texts extends 
purportedly over two and a half millennia. The sands of time and fires of war reduced the 
number of texts to less than ten.36 The military books included The Six Secret Teachings, The 
Methods of the Sima, The Art of War, Wuzi, Weiliaozi, Three Strategies of Huang Shigong, 
and Questions and Replies Between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong. These works, especially 
the The Art of War, created the base of military thought in China that also influenced much of 
East Asia. According to Mao Zedong, these ancient texts bore special importance as 
literature, sources of study, and inspiration for the people of China. In his essay, “Strategy in 
China’s Revolutionary War,” Mao wrote, “All military laws and military theories which are 
in the nature of principles are the experience of past wars summed up by people in former 
days or in our own times. We should seriously study these lessons, paid for in blood, which 
are a heritage of past wars.”37 This hard-purchased expertise developed from and reflected 
the experiences of the past that present scholars must study carefully, especially as new 
works of military thought and theory within the Chinese literary base, penned and spoken by 
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Mao himself, appeared in the twentieth century. These new texts demonstrated a steady 
continuity from the earliest times of Chinese military-philosophical literature. These common 
concepts included a consistent conceptualization about the societal role of warfare as a 
detestable but necessary violent action to create peace;, the importance of understandings and 
applying correctly complimentary opposites such as qi and zheng (unorthodox or surprise and 
orthodox or regular tactics) in a variety of situations; capitalizing on strengths and exploiting 
weaknesses; and adaptability to changing dynamics. This influence upon Mao’s writings 
ensured that these precepts continued to exercise an important guidance in the People’s 
Republic of China, carried forward in the canon of Mao that itself created the base of 
military-philosophical literature in the PRC. 
Unfortunately, as Mao noted, the shortcoming in the study of military-philosophical 
literature arose from a lack of “general summing-up…insufficient synthesis and 
systematization” of the Chinese classics.38 With the authoring of Mao’s works, the body of 
knowledge without proper amalgamation grew. Because of insufficient specialization, 
restraints of space, or inadequate resources, none of the works to date attempted to place 
Mao’s writings in the larger military-philosophical literary tradition of China. Many works 
attempted to draw parallels between The Art of War and Mao. This approach developed with 
good reason due to the parallels and direct quotations of The Art of War in Mao’s works. 
Many other authors, however, penned works that analysts must examine in conjunction with 
Mao’s writings to properly place the twentieth century works in the historical, literary, and 
philosophical context of Chinese military thought. Because of the important role of Mao’s 
writings in guiding PRC thought and theory as well as the recent attempts of the PRC to 
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reclaim their intangible cultural heritage, understanding the interrelatedness of these works 
serves to fill an important scholastic void. This work breaks new ground by including post 
20th century authors with classical masters, as Carine Deerfort noted, “Historical 
compilations of Chinese philosophy also often stop at the end of the nineteenth century or the 
beginning of the twentieth.”39 It furthermore attempts to build on the study of those works as 
a systematized, original, and subdivided whole of specialization in comparison and contrast 
to the works of Mao.40 One particular objective coupled hereto is an attempt to examine, 
from the perspective of military-philosophical history, the continuation with or departure 
from the “Chinese historical experience. 41 
The voluminous writings Mao produced and the constraints of this work limited this 
paper to draw primarily from Mao’s “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 
composed in 1936, and “Problems of War and Strategy,” created in 1938, both available in 
Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, published in 1967. These works provide a useful 
base of study as the major sources of Mao’s military thought. Other works, such as On 
Guerrilla War appear briefly throughout this paper to illustrate key concepts. To make 
comparisons for contextualization of Mao in Chinese military-philosophical literature, this 
work employs the military classics mentioned afore. This work uses at length The Art of War 
because of the central role this work plays throughout Chinese military history, the frequent 
referencing of this work in conjunction with Mao, and the general familiarity of the work 
with readers. Because of the far-reaching breadth of readership of the The Art of War, this 
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work includes notations from several of the most widely available editions. These include 
Lionel Giles’ 1910 edition, Samuel B. Griffith’s 1976 edition, Roger T. Ames’ 1993 edition, 
Ralph D. Sawyer’s 1993 edition, and Wu Rusong, Wu Xianlin, and Lin Wusun’s 2005 
edition. Other Classical Chinese works of philosophy useful for constructing this 
examination include Confucian texts such as Mencius to provide a framework of Chinese 
state-military interactions and the Mandate of Heaven. This work also consults Daoist works 
such as The Dao De Jing to clarify philosophical precepts such as yin and yang. This later 
model becomes especially important when explaining larger Chinese paradigms of balancing 
complementary opposites present in the military writings.  
Within China’s extensive literary tradition, the texts on military thought and theory 
represented one of the oldest and most important genres. Robin D. Yates asserted that this 
genre constituted the first body of works “written by private individuals for their own and 
their followers’ use.”42 Yates’ claim bore a keen understanding of the circumstances the 
authors, editors, and compilers penned life into this genre—namely, the chaos and conflict of 
the Warring States Period, (475-221 BCE). During this era of internecine war between the 
seven states of Qi, Chu, Yan, Han, Zhao, Wei, and Qin that fragmented from the fall of the 
Eastern Zhou, many philosophical traditions, both civil and military, arose as attempts to 
understand, guide, and correct the chaos of this tumultuous time.43 The military texts served 
as a means of providing recommendations for state survival, management of resources, and 
protection of the people. The authors and later owners of these texts found in this period an 
opportunity to gain employment and influence throughout the Warring States with their 
                                                          
42 Yates, 219. 
43 For a brief overview of this period, see Li, Xiaobing, “Warring States Period,” China at 
War: An Encyclopedia ed. Li, Xiaobing (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012): 484-484. For 
suggested further reading, Li included a bibliography at the conclusion of the entry. 
32 
expertise. Authored in the fires of war to bring peace to the land the final irony of the 
classical texts arrived at the conclusion of the Warring State Period when Qin Shi Huangdi, 
emperor of the unified China ordered the great book burning in 213 BCE wherein flames 
consumed many works of history, philosophy, and literature.  
These foundational works established a framework that demonstrated, in the words of 
Christopher C. Rand, “a continuous tradition of ideas about war—its execution, moral goals, 
and cosmic significance—loosely amalgamated into a common lore.”44 Though a common 
genre, the classical texts divided into four subgenres. The received and most generally 
accepted canon of the classical military texts divided into four subgenres based on 
specialization. In Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong, Li Jing 
reported that Jen Hung divided the classical works into four categories.45 Liu Xiang 
purportedly also divided the military texts into four separate groups based on specialization 
of skill: military power and planning; military form and positional advantage; yin-yang 
theorists; and military technologists; and craft specialists. 46 This categorization demonstrated 
a detailed and layered approach to war, with a variety of texts for a variety of situations.  
With the addition of Mao’s military writings, a new derivation of subgenres appeared: 
state theorists who wrote on behalf of the state and overthrow theorists who wrote texts on 
combating an established state with a rebel force to establish their own control over China. 
Ranging from the ancient period through today, internal political clashes formed the most 
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characteristic Chinese military experience.47 Mao’s writings contained some of the most 
evident references to terms like revolution and rebellion as a purpose of authorship. This 
created a seeming disengagement with the majority of the classical military texts that 
addressed conflict in broad terms of military thought and theory with the presumption that 
the commanders wielded similar armies under similar circumstances. This conclusion, 
however, overlooked one of the oldest and most interesting of the Classical Chinese tests. 
The Six Secret Teachings approached the problem of warfare as a question of seeking to 
depose an established government, namely the overthrow of the Shang by the Zhou (c. 1046 
BCE).48 Thus, in an interesting sense of completeness and cyclical progression, the most 
recent contribution to the military-philosophical literature of China complimented one of the 
earliest military texts by purpose of composition enough to generate a new subdivision of 
genres. 
Mao argued, however, that from these earlier works little in the way of similar 
circumstances carried over into his own time. In his essay, “Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary 
War,” Mao asserted, “All the laws for directing war develop as history develops and as war 
develops; nothing is changeless.”49 Three particular eras appeared in Chinese military history 
with relative ease to identify based on criteria such as weapons and organization. According 
to David A. Graff, “At the ancient and modern extremes, to be sure, certain changes are fairly 
obvious...the struggle to assimilate Western military technology, organization, and the ideas 
                                                          
47 Ralph D. Sawyer, Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1993), 24. 
48 Indeed, this war established the idea of the Mandate of Heaven as a justification for 
military action. See Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, Readings in Classical 
Chinese Philosophy (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2001), xiv. 
49 Mao, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 80. 
34 
in the late nineteenth century marks the other obvious watershed.”50 Furthermore, the 
complicated position of China as “semi-colonial and semi-feudal country” marked the most 
important difference as the fractured and chaotic nature of the political climate differed 
greatly from precedent.51 Since the establishment of the Zhou, China experienced only three 
significant periods of foreign invasion: the Mongolian established Yuan Dynasty (1271-
1368), the Manchurian established Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), and the period of imperialist 
expansion (1793-1945). This represented a notable deviation from the historical precedent of 
Chinese rebels overthrowing Chinese dynasties. These circumstances seemed to support an 
argument of little continuity between the periods. Such a conclusion, however, neglected the 
historically dominating characteristic of internal political clashes in China.52 The dominant 
nature of internal political clashes related to a philosophical precept ignored in this 
assessment. This precept held that change represented an element of continuity. According to 
Tian Chenshan “Change is itself an embodiment of continuity between things that are not 
strictly contrastive.”53 This continuity through change embodied the cyclical progression of 
order, decline, chaos, and replacement of regimes throughout Chinese history.  
In Classical Chinese philosophy, the concept of the Mandate of Heaven embodied 
this progression. The Mandate of Heaven, depending on the source, took on a variety of 
connotations, but overwhelmingly communicated justification of one source to take the reins 
of power because of their better ability to address the needs of the people. This justification 
did not possess mutual exclusivity of the ability of the one. Rather, it also contained an 
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explication of the failings of the current ruler, often manifested by mismanagement of state 
affairs, an inability to prevent disasters, and moral corruption. The victorious usurper-turned-
ruler then ushered in a new dynastic cycle that, overtime, also fell into disarray, then again 
cast aside when a better able sovereign wrested it away. This concept of the Mandate of 
Heaven had particularly interesting implications in the realm of military-philosophical 
literature. Indeed, the Zhou overthrow of the Shang served as not only the impetus for 
authoring the Six Secret Teachings but also the creation of the idea of the Mandate of 
Heaven.54 Furthermore, the Confucian philosopher Mozi tied the loss of the Mandate of 
Heaven with military action in “The Declaration of Yu” (also referred to as “The Declaration 
of Gan”), Mozi recounted the use of the Mandate of Heaven as a justification for overthrow 
of government. In a stirring, pre-battle speech, the king declared, “This ruler of Hu has 
destroyed and reviled the Five Phases and has been remiss and abandoned the Three Spheres. 
Heaven shall cut off his mandate.”55 Thus, warfare served as a means to bring about 
necessary change. This precept of continuity throughout change developed in both the civil-
philosophical modes and the military-philosophical models of the Classical Chinese authors. 
From this assessment, Mao’s military thoughts and theories fit comfortably into the martial 
tradition of China despite his own words. Not only did Mao write in a time of war in order to 
bring peace to China and independence from foreign influence, he also represented a unique 
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set of changes. In this manner, Mao represented continuity in the conceptualization of 
warfare as a means to protect the people in changing circumstances. 
A similar notion of continuity through change existed in the embodiment of 
complimentary opposites, or as a conceptualization known as yin and yang. Yin yang, often 
associated with Daoism, represented two forms of contradictory yet complimentary forces 
that appeared in pairs: yin the darker colored portion (feminine, soft, passive, cold) and yang 
the lighter portion (masculine, hard, active, warm). Neither of these occurred independent of 
the other. Rather, the existence of the one correlated to the existence of the other. Tien Chen-
ya, who cited Griffith, noted an adaptation of yin yang in Mao’s writings. 56 He did not 
attribute Mao’s “contradictory phenomena” to yin yang theory, however. Rather, Tien 
credited Marxist-Leninist influences. Specifically, Tien cited Mao’s observation, 
 
In war, offence and defense, advance and retreat, victory and defeat are all mutually 
contradictory phenomena. One cannot exist without the other. The two aspects are at 
once in conflict and interdependent, and this constitutes the totality of a war, pushes 
its development forward and solves its problems.57 
 
This quote possessed many of the same qualities as yin yang theory, namely “mutually 
contradictory phenomena,” correlative existence, and interdependence between conflicting 
phenomena. The Dao De Jing, for example, described,  
 
 Determinacy and indeterminacy give rise to each other,  
Difficult and easy complement each other,  
Long and short set each other off,  
High and low complete each other 
... 
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And before and after lend sequence to each other—58 
 
Within the philosophical tradition, this approach required a careful discernment of 
complex, interrelated intricacies of a situation. Graff noted this process, though “not 
necessarily contradictory” required the reader of Classical Chinese military tests to reconcile 
“two or more passages, or determining which might be the more applicable to the particular 
situation at hand.”59 According to Ames, this interpretation of events and philosophical 
writings required readers to recognize “...particular ‘things’ are in fact processual events, and 
are thus intrinsically related to the other things’ that provide them context.”60 In order to 
properly contextualize events and select the appropriate theorem, the situation took primacy 
over the individual or agency.61 What’s more, Mao’s writings furthered the idea that 
awareness of interconnectedness of details lead to understanding and understanding resulted 
in success. According to Mao, “It is well known that when you do anything, unless you 
understand its actual circumstances, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not 
know the laws governing it, or know how to do it, or be able to do it.”62 Thus, the idea of 
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discerning contextual circumstances and interrelatedness of the parts to the whole appeared 
in both Classical Chinese writings and Mao’s own military thought and theory. 
Mao himself argued that he possessed a dual nature as a whole with complimentary 
opposites. Stuart Schram citied Mao’s response, “In all things, one divides into two…I, too, 
am a case of one divides into two.”63 Michael Sheng also noted this sense of duality in Mao’s 
thought and theory, in the possession of a “tiger spirit” and a “monkey spirit.”64 Using animal 
symbolism, Mao described an ability to apply complimentary opposites as the situation 
warranted. The “tiger spirit,” harkened to traditional Chinese symbolism, of outward displays 
of martial prowess as the “tiger spirit” while the “monkey spirit” symbolized his ability to 
use deception, adaptability, and subterfuge. This relationship between complimentary 
opposites of outwardly strong and subtly clever existed also in the classical military writings. 
The Three Strategies, contained many examples of this principle, though one noteworthy 
quotation tied particular strong to Mao, “Thus I say everyone covets strength, but rare are 
those capable of preserving the subtle. If someone can preserve the subtle he can protect his 
life.”65 The Six Secret Teachings noted simply, “One who does not have a penetrating 
understanding of both order and chaos cannot be spoken with about changes.” 66 In this 
context, changes indicated a myriad of causes and effects that concerned commanders. 
Understanding these circumstances required a basic sense of the interrelatedness of 
complimentary opposites.  
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These appeared not only in the descriptions of the qualities of rulers and generals, but 
also in terms of force sizes and compositions. For example, the Weiliaozi described the 
complimentary opposites of heavy and light forces, “A heavy army is like the mountains, like 
the forests, like the rivers and great streams. A light force is like a roaring fire...”67 In this 
description, the author noted that both types of forces, heavy and light, possessed unique and 
useful qualities. A heavy army had strength, force of presence, and could cover a vast area, 
but it was not the sole superior force. In a complimentary opposite fashion, a light force 
possessed mobility, the means to harass and pressure, and an ability to fight, ambush, 
withdraw, and confuse the enemy but it too was not the sole superior force. With proper 
application, these forces could overcome the opposition and even therein create 
complimentary opposites of sorts by causing “the enemy’s troops to be unable to disperse 
and those that are dispersed to be unable to reassemble.”68  
Mao’s writings also demonstrated awareness of Chinese military thought and theory 
that possessed a great sense of philosophical continuity. Of the classical Chinese military 
theorists, nearly all had some connection between war and political objectives. While for 
some these connections appeared as implicit correlations, inclusions in The Art of War, The 
Six Secret Teachings, and Methods of the Sima explicated these relations in terms not merely 
similar to Mao’s writings but also comparable to Clausewitz. Few traditional Chinese works 
extolled the connection between war and affairs of state, and thus political objectives, better 
than The Art of War. According to this text, “War is a question of vital importance to the 
state, a matter of life and death, the road to survival or ruin. Hence, it is a subject which calls 
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for careful study.”69 A quotation of this line appeared in The Six Secret Teachings, attributed 
to the Tai Gong. It read, “Thus, ‘warfare is the greatest affair of state, the [Dao] of survival or 
extinction.’” 70 This line from Sunzi’s seminal work, explained directly war held a status of 
concern for the “state,” as differentiated from personal conflicts presumably by natures of 
resources and scale of conflict, and thus took on a political nature. Finally, The Methods of 
the Sima held a similar connection between power, influence, and authority with war and 
violence. This work explained the source of “Authority comes from warfare, not from 
harmony among men. For this reason if one must kill men to give peace to the people, then 
killing is permissible.”71 A much more pragmatic, if draconian, interpretation of the 
interactions between peace and war, as well as amongst men, this quotation drew similar 
connections to the ultimate aim of war to create peace for the people through the 
establishment of order by violence.  
These selections bore striking resemblance to Mao’s assessments of war. Mao’s best-
known description of the relationship between war, politics, and power, from his essay 
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“Problems of War and Strategy,” argued, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”72 
This quote contained many of the elements the classical Chinese theoreticians’ writings 
advocated, namely a connection between politics and violence, with an implicit source of 
power from force, presumably from both the active and potential to execute. Mao further 
expanded on these ideas to explain, “The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of 
the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution.”73 This explanation 
carried even stronger bonds to The Art of War, The Six Secret Teachings, and The Methods of 
the Sima as it vehemently contended that violence exemplified the means to gain power. 
Following this line, Mao tied this principle to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, however. He 
wrote, “This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and 
for all other countries.” Though Mao credited Marxism-Leninism as his source of inspiration 
in this instance, these works fell too, at times, under the perceptual umbrella of Marxism-
Leninism according to the Chinese Communist Party because of the inclusion of 
“materialism and dialectics” in works like The Art of War.74 What’s more, these works 
possessed histories that appealed to the cultural heritage of China. As noted afore, the 
theories found in The Art of War proved so influential that other works, such as The Six 
Secret Teachings and Questions and Replies Between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong 
contained lines from this work while other texts exhibited similar conceptual principles. 
During a speech at the Group Leaders’ Forum of the Enlarged Meeting of the Military 
Affairs Committee, June 28, 1958, Mao reminisced that many of China’s heroic military 
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leaders “all knew how to fight wars. China’s past has quite a lot to offer.”75 From such points 
as previous conflicts, Mao tied the future security of the (PRC) with the military prestige of 
past eras.  
This connection persisted overtly so long as it did not infringe upon the import and 
influence of Mao. As Schram noted, when “questioned in his later years about what he 
learned from the Chinese classics, [Mao] was generally whimsical and frequently 
contradictory in his replies.”76 Many of his Open Dialogues from the time of the Cultural 
Revolution sought to downplay the importance of The Art of War in the development of 
Mao’s military thought and theory or criticize those who extolled it as an exemplary work. 
During a speech given to the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau, March 20, 1966, Mao 
denied any significant influence from The Art of War upon Red Army commanders. He 
explained that Red Army soldiers “...never studied the military tactics of [Sunzi]. Yet, did 
they not do battle just the same? Not a single person fought any battles in accordance with 
[Sunzi] on The Art of War.”77 This resulted from Mao’s attempts to build the legitimacy of 
his work and cult of personality by denying the influences and significance of previous eras, 
a seeming contradiction of his previous exhalations of the military classics. This active 
denial, itself, held close to the traditional histories that denigrated the older regimes and 
extolled the new in order to build popular legitimacy. 
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Despite these conflicting claims of sources and clashing assessments, a series of 
continuous military-philosophical precepts of the relationship between war, violence, and 
politics persisted from the Classical Chinese works to Mao’s writings. Chiefly, this 
relationship demonstrated that war served two overt and related purposes: a use of violence 
to restore peace amongst the people and as a means to gain political power. Though 
associated with malevolence because of the use of weapons, described as “evil implements” 
by the exemplary “Sage Kings,” and the deaths and destruction these brought, war had an 
appropriate time and place, such that not even the worthiest monarchs of legend could avoid 
it.78 The Weiliaozi explained “...Conflict is a contrary virtue.” 79 This contradiction arose from 
the realization that, with an ultimate aim to create peace and prosperity, war had to create 
chaos and destruction. This too resonated with the words of Mao that “The aim of war is to 
eliminate war.”80 An evil but given the alternatives of prolonged suffering of the people, 
rebellion and disorder, and the expenses to the treasury, or the suffering of the people under 
an ineffective government, war served as the most expedient means to end these evils. A 
bitter medicine, indeed, washed down with the tears of families and blood of the people, but 
the best available cure for the ailment. 
 With a framework of complimentary opposites and the essential nature of 
understanding the intricate interconnectedness of phenomena, another issue may come to 
rest, namely the conflict between whether the Chinese military-philosophical tradition 
advocated as an artistic or a scientific approach to war and to what extent this permeated 
Mao’s writings. This debate built one of the most frustrating issues for Western readers and 
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indeed an intense issue of debate amongst scholars of Chinese military history in the English 
Language. Tien brought this problem to attention by noting that The Art of War’s discussion 
that “military devices ‘are the strategist’s keys to victory. It is not possible to discuss them 
beforehand,’ caused many writers to conclude that the Chinese military-philosophical 
approach contained a “high level of artistry.”81 According to Tien, the exact cause of issue in 
this line resulted from the use of the term “Art of War” in connection with Sunzi’s writings.82 
Sawyer explained this line held two possible connotations, either that a general could not 
share his plans before battle or that military thoughts and theories could not “be rigidly or 
arbitrarily determined before the situation.”83 Unfortunately, Tien, and to a lesser extent, 
Sawyer, built their interpretations from an incorrect focal point. Rather than examine the 
complications of artistry found in this quote, the proper element of note resided in the 
examination of discussing or speaking of such things. The second proposition put forth by 
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Sawyer held considerably greater substance when compared to a commentary of Mei 
Yaochen, included in Griffith’s work. Mei wrote, “When confronted by the enemy respond to 
changing circumstances and devise expedients. How can these be discussed beforehand?”84 
Thus, The Art of War did not prohibit the examining of these issues rather than simply 
elucidated to do so in exhaustive detail was impossible as excessive amount of discussion 
lead to an undermining of adaptability as it created a set of prescribed circumstances and 
specific responses. 
 Mao included examples that illustrated his understandings of maintaining an open, 
and adaptable approach to war through discernment of multiple intricacies. In “Strategy in 
China’s Revolutionary War,” Mao noted, “Any war situation which acquires a 
comprehensive consideration of its various aspects and stages forms a war situation as a 
whole.”85 He further added, 
 
It is well known that when you do anything, unless you understand its actual 
circumstances, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws 
governing it, or know how to do it, or be able to do it.86  
 
Tien used this quote to support his conclusion that Mao observed no artistry in war.87 Rather, 
he persisted in his conclusion that to Mao, science and war held synonymous status. Tien, 
cited Mao’s assessment “All military laws and military theories which are in the nature of 
principles are the experience of past wars summed up by people in former days or in our own 
time;” they “...like the laws governing all other things, are reflections in our minds of 
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objective realities...”88 This selection, however, seemed to have less to do with measurable, 
scientific principles of military application and more to do with interpretive understanding of 
situations. When divorced from the question of artistry or science and instead placed into the 
proper context of analyzing, understanding, and predicting a myriad of intricate phenomena 
in one event, this conceptualization fell much more appropriately into the tradition of 
Chinese military-philosophical thought. Mao’s other writings further developed this 
connection. In “Strategy in China’s Revolution,” Mao noted, “Any war situation which 
acquires a comprehensive consideration of its various aspects and stages forms a war 
situation as a whole.”89 The matter of artistry or science, or discriminating a proper tactical 
response to be in accord with the strategies of the cosmos or formulating careful 
mathematical calculations to formulate the most appropriate scientific response possessed no 
significant bearing on this understanding of war found in both the Classical Chinese texts and 
Mao’s writings. Alternatively, it held simple, pragmatic advice to prevent an inappropriate 
assessment of a situation born from incorrect preconceived notions and plans that could 
thereby lead to tragic military failure. 
 Within a military context, a number of important complimentary opposites arose in 
the Classical military texts that continued into the works of Mao. These included most 
notably the ideas of qi and zheng. Here again, another debate of terminology arose in the 
study of theory, namely whether the terms qi and zheng connoted meanings ranging from 
indirect and direct, normal and extraordinary, imbalance/asymmetry and spiking, unorthodox 
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and orthodox, or surprise and straightforward. Giles translated these terms to mean direct and 
indirect, 
 
To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and 
remain unshaken—this is effected by maneuvers direct [zheng] and indirect [qi]...In 
all fighting, the direct [zheng] method may be used for joining battle, but indirect [qi] 
methods will be needed in order to secure victory...Indirect [qi] tactics, efficiently 
applies, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and 
streams.90 
 
Following Giles, Griffith translated these terms the same passages, 
 
That the army is certain to sustain the enemy’s attack without suffering defeat is due 
to operations of the extraordinary [qi] and the normal [zheng] forces...Generally, in 
battle, use the normal [zheng] force to engage; use the extraordinary [qi] to win. Now 
the resources of those skilled in the use of extraordinary [qi] forces are as infinite as 
the heavens and earth; an inexhaustible as the flow of the great rivers.91 
 
Griffith also included an explanation of this passage from Li Quan that contextualized these 
passages. According to Li Quan, “the force which confronts the enemy is the normal [zheng]; 
that which goes to his flanks the extraordinary [qi]. No commander of an army can wrest the 
advantage from the enemy without extraordinary [qi] forces.”92 The issue came to a linguistic 
examination in Benjamin E. Wallacker’s 1966 article “Two Concepts in Early Chinese 
Military Thought.” Therein, Wallacker argued that the Griffith misinterpreted qi and zheng in 
his translations of The Art of War. Instead, using terms less familiar to Chinese military 
thought and theory and more so to European jousting, Wallacker insisted that qi most nearly 
connoted an idea of imbalance and asymmetry and zheng “spiking” an opponent in place.93 
While this assessment may assist in illustrating a portion of the meaning and imagery of 
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these terms, it removed any connotations of the larger strategic connotations from the terms 
and instead placed them in more tactical descriptors. Sawyer chose to interpret the words in 
similar terms to Griffith, but with a vocabulary indicative of the military interests of the 
middle and late twentieth century. According to Sawyer’s interpretation, the passage read, 
 
What enables the masses of the Three Armies to invariably withstand the enemy 
without being defeated are the unorthodox [qi] and orthodox [zheng]...In general, in 
battle one engaged with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox. Thus 
one who excels at sending forth the unorthodox is as inexhaustible as Heaven, as 
unlimited as the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers.94 
 
Wu, Wu, and Lin chose not to translate the terms and instead preserved them as qi and zheng, 
 
Thanks to the combined use of qi and zheng tactics, the army is able to withstand the 
onslaught of the enemy forces...Generally, in battle, use zheng to engage the enemy 
and use qi to score victory. The resourcefulness of those skilled in the use of qi is as 
inexhaustible as heaven and earth and as unending as the flow of rivers.95 
 
Rather than attempt to apply foreign descriptors to this, Wu, Wu, and Lin chose to keep the 
terms qi and zheng and, with them, applied a lengthy explanation of these terms in an 
appendix. The final significant contributor to this debate of terminology, Ames, translated the 
passage as, 
 
It is ‘surprise’ [qi] and ‘straightforward’ [zheng] operations that enable one’s army to 
withstand the full assault of the enemy force and remain undefeated...Generally in 
battle use ‘straightforward’ to engage the enemy and the ‘surprise’ to win victory. 
Thus the expert at delivering the surprise assault is as boundless as the heavens and 
earth, and as inexhaustible as the rivers and seas.96 
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Ames explained his word choice as a matter of correlativity. The use of “regular” and 
“irregular” in place of zheng and qi did not appropriately “capture their correlativity” as this 
connoted a use of “regular army” and “irregular militia.”97 This word choice held too specific 
associations regarding specializations of troops operations rather than a more broad 
applicability to usages of troops as determined by the situation. Instead, he chose the terms 
“surprise” and “straightforward” because these terms had a wider applicability to a variety of 
military situations as what the enemy possessed the ability to expect and what stunned him. 
Ames did not, however, combine the terms “irregular militia” and “guerrilla.”98 According to 
Ames, “it might be otherwise ‘regular’ action that surprises an enemy using guerrilla tactics.” 
99 The presumable corollary to this held that it might be otherwise “guerrilla” action that 
surprises an enemy using regular tactics. 
 Mao’s approaches to warfare conformed to this idea of complimentary opposites, 
especially those of qi and zheng.100 Such continuity appeared nowhere more prominently 
than concerning his assessments of guerrilla forces. Mao argued guerrillas fulfilled an 
accompanying role to regular forces and fulfilled an essential role on combat overall, but did 
not possess the ability to fulfill the same missions as conventional troops. According to Mao, 
 
Though the strategy of guerrillas is inseparable from war strategy as a whole, the 
actual conduct of these hostilities differs from the conduct of orthodox operations. 
Each type of warfare has methods peculiar to itself, and methods suitable to regular 
warfare cannot be applied with success to the special situations that confront 
guerrillas.101 
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In this passage, Mao used terms that described actions such as “conduct” and “methods” to 
differentiate between the missions of regular and guerrilla troops. This note supported Ames 
justification for choosing to translate qi and zheng as “surprise” and “straightforward.” As 
Mao noted, and Ames argued, the actions of the troops defined their nature of qi and zheng 
more so than any official designations. 
 Extended from Ames’ interpretation of qi and zheng as surprise and straightforward 
to not create inappropriate connotations of troop types rather than troop actions (but bearing 
in mind the ideas of orthodox and unorthodox as possible alternatives used with caution) 
Mao’s guerrilla warfare theory fell well into the category of qi and zheng discourses. Since 
actions and circumstances determine the nature of qi or zheng forces, examining the 
particular tactics associated with guerrillas will place Mao’s writings in a tactical continuity 
with the Classical Chinese authors. Mao’s essay, “Basic Tactics,” held numerous references 
to ambuscades and false retreats as a means for qi to engage zheng. One exemplary passage 
noted guerrillas overcame numerical inferiority with “sudden attacks and ambushes, so as to 
‘cause an uproar in the east and strike in the west,’ appearing now here and now there, using 
false banners and making empty demonstrations, propagating rumors about one's own 
strength, etc.”102 The Six Secret Teachings described a similar approach to using ambushes in 
conjunction with unorthodox troops. The text advised, “Setting up ingenious ambushes and 
preparing unorthodox troops, stretching our distant formations to deceive and entice the 
enemy are the means by which to destroy the enemy’s army and capture its general.”103 A 
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similar line appeared in Mao’s “Basic Tactics,” that noted, “When the enemy is pursuing us 
in great haste we select a spot for an ambush and wait until he arrives. Thus, we can capture 
the enemy all at one stroke.”104 Both cases instructed commanders to bait the enemy into 
pursuing a seemingly weaker or broken force into an ambush where surprise, positional 
advantage, and possession of the initiative in battle compensated for other shortcomings. The 
implement of feigned retreats often fell into the category of qi tactics. In Questions and 
Replies, Li Jing quoted The Art of War to demonstrate that “feigned retreats” and “although 
capable display incapability,” are unorthodox.105 Questions and Replies stated “In general, 
when troops advance to the front it is orthodox, when they [deliberately] retreat to the rear it 
is unorthodox.”106 Feigned retreats appeared throughout the Classical Chinese texts as a 
means to overextend the enemy or entice him into an ambush. These are merely two 
examples of qi and zheng tactics. In the traditional conceptualization of qi and zheng, the two 
had no beginning and end, as each came from and lead to the other. This, of course, came 
from the intricate details of the specific situation. Qi in one moment became zheng in another 
as the opposing zheng from the former morphed into qi in the latter.  
In a military context, the circumstances of the commander, his force, and his 
resources as well as a consideration of the opposing commander, his force, and his resources 
determined the implementation of qi or zheng. The civil philosophical text, the Dao De Jing, 
articulated the necessity of understanding situations. This text explained that one who sought 
to gain an objective without being in accord with their situation would not succeed.107 Such 
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adaptations sought to create circumstances where commanders possessed the most 
advantageous position based on their abilities at that moment. Often, this consisted of a 
paired set of ideas, namely capitalizing on strengths and exploiting weaknesses. While the 
Classical Chinese military-philosophical texts presumed generally that the forces engaged in 
hostilities possessed some semblance of parity overall, these works nevertheless postulated 
the possibility that a force may engage a superior enemy. This case appeared most notable in 
The Six Secret Teachings and, to a lesser extent in Questions and Replies because of the 
frequent referencing of this work by Li Jing, as well as The Art of War and The Methods of 
the Sima. The Six Secret Teachings explained the matter in less cosmological, more 
pragmatic terms, as it encouraged the reader to, “Accord with the situation, be very cautious 
in making plans, and employ your material resources.” 108  
The Art of War also referred to increasing the possibility of success by according with 
the circumstances. In this work, such adaptability appeared as a matter of being 
“invulnerable” and selecting the appropriate time to act. The Art of War advised readers, 
“The skilled commanders of the past first made themselves invulnerable, then waited for the 
enemy’s movement of vulnerability.”109 Such invulnerability came from being in accord with 
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their military strengths and weaknesses as well as those of the enemy. The Six Secret 
Teachings explained the state of invulnerability arose from understanding the circumstances 
surrounding the commander and the oppositions, as well as the timing of combat. According 
to the text, “One who excels at warfare will await events in the situation without making any 
movement. When he sees he can be victorious, we will arise; if he sees he cannot be 
victorious, we will desist. Thus it is said he does not have any fear, he does not vacillate. Of 
the many harms that can beset an army, vacillation is the greatest. Of disasters that can befall 
an army, none surpasses doubt.”110 The Methods of the Sima added further to this statement, 
in terms that familiar to Mao’s writings. In addition to recognizing his own personal 
strengths and weaknesses as a leader and planner, the resources available to forces, and their 
positional advantage, the text advised that commanders had to possess an awareness of the 
particulars of troops as well. The Methods of the Sima stated, “Employ what [your men] 
want, and effect what they are capable of; abolish what they do not want and are incapable 
of. Do the opposite of this to the enemy.”111 From these understandings, Questions and 
Replies explained how to assess whether to employ qi or zheng as a response. According to 
Questions and Replies, “If the enemy is substantial, then I must use the orthodox. If the 
enemy is vacuous, then I must use the unorthodox.”112 If a force suited for qi tactics in a 
situation suitable for qi tactics where the enemy demonstrated weakness to qi tactics, 
employed qi tactics, then the commander made himself unconquerable. Alternatively, if a 
force suited to zheng tactics in a situation suitable for zheng tactics employed qi tactics, the 
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commander made himself conquerable. Understandably, considering the circumstances of a 
mixed-experience and equipment force, irregular supply, and minimally trained forces Mao’s 
Red Army often utilized, qi tactics offered the most lucrative possibilities for success. Being 
that the instant determined the course of action, adaptability to changing circumstances 
became a necessity.  
To wait for circumstances to be completely favorable prevented commanders from 
seizing the initiative at times and thereby creating a dangerous delay that could unnecessarily 
prolong hostilities. When favorable circumstances did not manifest, the authors advocated 
creating circumstances for victory. Sawyer analyzed this idea in his interpretation of The Art 
of War, with the inclusion of a commentary from Kuan Feng that articulated orthodox meant 
to realize an advantage and unorthodox meant a response to turn a disadvantage into an 
advantage.113 In his essay “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” Mao noted, “To defeat 
the offensive of an enemy who enjoys absolute superiority we rely on the situation created 
during the stage of our strategic retreat, a situation which is favorable to ourselves, 
unfavorable to the enemy and different from that at the beginning of his offensive.”114 
Furthermore, Mao described several such evaluations to create favorable circumstances in his 
“Sixteen Character Formula.” This formula held “The enemy advances, we retreat; the 
enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.”115 Tien 
drew multiple connections between this and The Art of War.116 Mao’s assessments bore 
similarity to, though not transcription of, words from The Art of War that instructed, “Thus, 
when the enemy is rested, tire him; when well fed, starve him; and when settled, get him on 
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the move.”117 Furthermore, The Methods of the Sima contained a series of guiding principles 
that built upon these, “In general, in warfare: Attack the weak and quiet, avoid the strong and 
quiet. Attack the tired, avoid the well trained and alert. Attack the truly afraid, avoid those 
that [display] only minor fears. From antiquity these have been the rules for governing [the 
army].”118 In all selections, paired statements of a situation and an appropriate action to 
capitalize on the circumstances appeared. The notable difference in Mao’s “Sixteen 
Character Formula” from the classical texts resided in the specific circumstances behind the 
genesis of Mao’s military writings, namely that the Red Army often found itself combating a 
numerically and logistically superior force. Mao extrapolated a root concept from both The 
Art of War and The Methods of the Sima and added details pertinent to the Red Army. A 
combined approach, then, contained, 
 
Sima: Attack the weak and quiet, avoid the strong and quiet; 
Mao: when the enemy advances, we retreat;  
Mao: the enemy camps, we harass;  
Sunzi: the enemy is settled, we get him on the move; 
Sunzi: the enemy is rested, tire him;  
Sunzi: the enemy is well fed, we starve him; 
Mao: the enemy tires, we attack;  
Simafa: attack the tired, avoid the well trained and alert; 
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Mao: the enemy retreats, we pursue;  
Simafa: attack the truly afraid, avoid those that [display] only minor fears get him on 
the move. 
 
To be certain, some aspects seemed repetitive. This repetition, as often the case developed in 
literature, arose as a point of emphasis by the authors. Nevertheless, alone or as a combined 
concept, these formulae explain how forces can strengthen their overall position by not 
attacking the enemy directly in a decisive engagement but reducing his ability to respond 
effectively in preparation for a decisive engagement when circumstances allow.  
 The military-philosophical literary tradition of China demonstrated a rich tradition of 
insightful concepts from the earliest writings through to Mao. Edward L. Dreyer, however, 
argued this tradition is the greatest weakness of the PRC and People’s Liberation Army. 
According to Dreyer, “China’s efforts to match and surpass [United States military progress] 
will continue to be hindered by too much baggage from her long history.”119 Mao recognized 
certain circumstantial limitations in the situation of China born from nearly a hundred years 
as a semi-colonial state with a weak imperial and later fractured republican government. Mao 
also recognized in the tradition of ever-flowing continuity and change that these 
circumstances bore little permanence. Even during the era of the conflict when Mao 
composed his core military treaties, he recognized these circumstances had a time to end. 
According to Mao, “Our army will then attain a high degree of centralization and 
organization, and its operations will lose much of their guerrilla character and attain a high 
degree of regularity; what is now on a low level will then be raised to a higher level, and the 
Chinese type of regular warfare will change into the general type.”120 If Dreyer’s thesis bears 
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acceptance, in the case of change and continuity, this too will, be only for a phase. Clearly, 
the military classics played an important role in Chinese history because of their official 
nature. If these texts did not have some intrinsic value of substance, there would have been 
no occasion for them to become state canon on military matters. Furthermore, if the 
information contained therein were not continuously useful, there would be no need to 
continue to use them in official state exams or debates as to do so would endanger the 
security of the state. The early successes of the texts explain their initial adoption as state 
policy; their continued usefulness ensured this highly regarded status continued. 
Is Mao the Sunzi of the twentieth century? To use the response often attributed to 
Mao, “It’s too early to tell.” As the evidence stands now, the legacy of Mao’s military 
thought and theory will not attain the same note as The Art of War. This perception, however, 
originates not in the widespread dissemination of the work, as more people in more 
languages gained access of Mao’s writings in the time of his life and shortly thereafter, 
whereas Sunzi’s works remained largely secret. Instead, the foci of the works differentiate 
the import of Mao from Sunzi. Sunzi’s writings centered on state versus state warfare and, 
while certain aspects of this specialization of Chinese military writings carried over to Mao’s 
it remained a distinct and separate subgenre. What’s more, many of these continuous 
elements appeared throughout the received military texts. With the addition of Mao’s 
writings to the military canon, alongside The Six Secret Teachings, a new classification of 
literature appeared concerned primarily with overthrowing an established order. Perhaps a 
better equation between the role of Mao’s writings and the extant and distinct traditions of 
military writings in Chinese history is Mao the Tai Gong of the twentieth century? Again, it 
is too early to tell.  
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BY DESIGN: REVOLUTIONARY GUERRILLA WARFARE AS ANTI-IMPERIALISM 
 
As Mao noted, his period of history contained a set of unique circumstances that 
defined it as separate from the historical continuity of previous eras of Chinese history. Most 
notably, his time witnessed the division of China into a “semi-colonial” state. Readers should 
not find it surprising then that anti-imperialist rhetoric filled Mao Zedong’s writings. This 
became most apparent in his works related to ideological and armed conflict between the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States (US). His military and political 
writings espoused revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a means to not only overthrow but also 
defend against capitalist and imperialist incursions into Asia. This method of warfare as a 
means to resist Western (US-UN) encroachments upon Asia confronted its specifically 
designed enemy during the Korean War, when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) and Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPVF) battled the Republic of Korea (ROK) and 
US-UN for physical and ideological control of the peninsula. At the outset of the war, 
Chinese policy makers listed several reasons for the PRC’s involvement in a foreign war that 
included a combination of international and domestic concerns that sought to protect China, 
and by extension East Asia, from foreign and especially capitalist-imperialist Western 
influences. In statements issues by Mao and Marshal Nie Rongzhen, four general objectives 
appeared that characterized the nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a strategy well 
suited for anti-imperialist war. These included an emphasis on “people’s war,” a combined 
emphasis on human power and de-emphasis on technology and machines, resist US 
encroachments in both physical and ideological forms, resist foreign encroachments 
throughout East Asia, and protect the interests of the fledgling PRC. Though physical 
manifestations of violence, conflict, and hardship symbolized the three years of the Korean 
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War in the most tangible and appreciable ways, the abstract thought, theory, and direction of 
Mao’s revolutionary guerrilla warfare provided a means to combat advanced, industrialized 
Western militaries that sought to conquer hearts and minds as well as lands and seas. 
Considering the duality of this politically charged conflict, the infusion of anti-imperialist 
rhetoric into the model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare ensured that with the spread of this 
information so too spread Chinese influence in the region. 
Allen S. Witting’s China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, 
published in 1960, created the foundation for the English language study of the PRC/CPVF 
in the Korean War. Whiting concluded that “expectations may be inferred [about the PRC] 
from ideological assumptions about the enemy and past experience of him.”121 The past 
experiences Whiting described included a broader understanding of Chinese history and 
culture. This understanding allowed Whiting to create the work he did because of the time in 
which Whiting composed it, because the source material available to him consisted mainly of 
US-UN intelligence reports, Chinese propaganda, and newspaper articles from various 
sources—a weakness that Whiting possessed a keen understanding.122 Following the opening 
of Chinese archives and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century, 
researchers gained access to new and crucial information. This flood of sources created a 
“new Cold War” history that, for the first time, based analytical conclusions on 
documentation form a variety of sources and sides rather than ideologically charged one-
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sided accounts and collected propaganda.123 In 1995, Shu Guang Zhang published Mao’s 
Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953. Shu’s work laid plainly at the 
feet of Mao and his personal ambitions to regain Chinese supremacy the causes for the PRC 
entry into the Korean War as an effort to assert their power in the face of Western threats and 
demonstrate their value as an ally to Asia.124 Shortly thereafter, in 1997, Michael Sheng 
published Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States. In this work, 
Sheng echoed the common arguments that Mao and the PRC acted as a dedicated cohort to 
the Communist Bloc and denied the arguments of a more self-determined PRC.125 
Furthermore, his work carried the argument of the importance and centrality of the ideology 
of revolutions. Interestingly, he argued that Maoism possessed a dualism of a “tiger spirit” 
(outward displays of prowess) and a “monkey spirit,” (deception, adaptability, and 
subterfuge).126 Chen Jian authored the most recent work of import on the subject, Mao’s 
China and the Cold War, published in 2001. Chen argued, based on his access to Chinese 
records that Mao aimed to achieve the idea of a perpetual class struggle and larger goal of an 
Asia-wide revolution. According to Chen, this resulted in both the involvement of the PRC in 
the Korean War and PRC support for Ho Chi Minh.127  
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This study examines the use of revolutionary guerrilla warfare by the PRC as a means 
to combat Western encroachments viewed as imperialistic and the use of revolutionary 
guerrilla warfare as a means to spread PRC influence in Asia by building upon the culturally 
aware foundation established by Whiting and the pro-Chinese interest/larger East Asian 
revolution theory advocated by Zhang and Chen. Significant primary materials used in 
explicating this topic included the Selected Works series collections of Mao’s writings, 
especially his military writings. In addition to these, Quotations from Chairman Mao also 
provided useful insights. While the programs of Deng Xiaoping’s “opening to the outside 
world,” begun in the 1970s and 1980s, instituted a number of helpful reforms to the study of 
Chinese history, the CCP continues to strictly control access to sensitive archives. 
Unfortunately, as Jian Chen notes, “In most circumstances, scholars must rely upon ‘selected 
documents’ to study China’s Cold War history.”128 Interestingly, when Mao, Zhou Enlai, 
Henry Kissinger, and Richard Nixon conducted a number of discussions on the relations 
between the PRC and the US during the 1970s, Mao remarked, concerning his collective 
writings, “Those writings of mine aren’t anything. There is nothing instructive in what I 
wrote.”129 Despite the questions raised regarding the authority of these works following their 
editing and compiling process and Mao’s own humbling analysis, these documents do not 
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stray significantly from the tradition of the official histories of Imperial China.130 
Furthermore, declassified documents, especially telegrams exchanged between Beijing, 
Moscow, and Pyongyang composed a noteworthy addition to the research materials for this 
analysis. Reminiscent of Whiting’s preface line, “This approach is intended neither to justify 
Chinese Communist action nor to find fault with U.S. and U.N. decisions,”131 it is necessary 
to add here a similar statement. This analysis neither justifies PRC actions nor resurrects 
ideological conflicts. Instead, it seeks to articulate in the English language the qualities of 
imperialism the PRC, especially policy makers such as Mao, observed in the US and to 
describe the application of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a model of warfare especially 
suited to combating more industrially capable, extended and projected forces outside of their 
home culture. Expanding the English language study of these issues, especially in an attempt 
to recount these details from a Chinese-perspective, adds a significant contribution to 
understanding historical events in terms of not only one’s own perspective, but also the 
perspective of the opposition. This work also expands the current trend in US military 
historiography of “lessons learned” to not concentrate merely on the “what we did wrong” 
approach, but also add to this a “what they did right” interpretation. 
This work builds on the definition of imperialism as articulated by Mao inspired by 
his interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. Although other persons participated in the planning 
and execution of the Korean War, because of the active and central role of Mao in Chinese 
policy, as well as the continuing influence of his theoretical writings that guided Chinese 
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military, government, and civil policy from the 1950s through the 1970s, any study of the 
PRC policy must begin with an examination in detail his thoughts and theories. From the 
Selected Works series of documents from Mao and the infamous collection of essays and 
speeches by Mao, Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, an explicit definition of 
“imperialism” surfaced after careful analytical examination.132 Mao sought to tie the roots of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the Marxist-Leninist ideologies of communism.133 
Considering that he repeatedly drew attention to this supposed connection between the CCP 
and Marxism, Marx’s definitions of imperialism served as a usable starting point from which 
to extrapolate further details of Mao’s definition. According to Marx, the foundations 
themselves of imperialism occurred by force. In his address to the Paris Commune, May 
1871, Marx noted a distinct connection between militarism and economics with the rise of 
imperialism when he described the origin of empires: “The empire, with the coup d’état for 
its birth certificate,...and the sword for its sceptre...”134 This quote held not only beginning of 
imperialism by force but also the maintenance and spread of its influence found in the same 
means as symbolized by the references to the “coup d’état” and “sword for its scepter.” 
Marx’s fundamental argument that inspired communism, centered on economic struggles 
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that, in the case of imperialism, manifested as exploitation of one group for the profit of the 
other. Lenin built upon this concept of economics and violence when he described 
imperialism as a stage of capitalism. According to Lenin, “Imperialism is a specific historical 
stage of capitalism. Its specific character is threefold: imperialism is monopoly capitalism; 
parasitic, or decaying capitalism; moribund capitalism.”135 This connection to economic 
dominance continued throughout Mao’s works on imperialism, notably in essays such as 
“Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers,” and “U.S. Imperialism is a Paper 
Tiger.”136 For example, he described imperialists as “the slave-owning class, the feudal 
landlord class and the bourgeoisie.”137 These descriptions held tenuous overt connections to 
the US of 1950 on, as they either harkened back to previous eras of US history (“slave-
owning class,” though Mao demonstrated consciousness of the social conflicts within the US 
during the 1960s) or descriptions reminiscent of US consumerism.138 Mao’s definition of 
imperialism with relation to foreign powers, however, gained more specificity as his writings 
shifted from social concerns into other realms. 
Just as Marx and Lenin both discussed and emphasized a connection between 
imperialism and an inevitable violent upheaval of the proletariat, so too Mao added an 
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element of violence to his model. He described the duality of imperialists—their “paper 
tiger” and “real tiger” qualities—as one where “they devoured people, devoured people by 
the millions and tens of millions.”139 Because of the scale of the devouring, this statement 
communicated a combination of economic devouring through impoverishment and physical 
devouring through violent conflict. Mao reinforced this last aspect when he alluded to the 
devouring of “tens of millions of lives before the victory in 1949.”140 From here, Mao added 
that imperialism used force to seize “colonies and semi-colonies,” and oppress the people.141 
While these descriptions contained parallels to the descriptions provided by Marx and Lenin, 
they also articulated a distinct character of his interpretation of imperialism forged in the two 
hundred years of Western colonization and, experiences that are more personal to his own. 
Throughout the work, he named specific powers that embodied his definition of imperialism, 
such as Japan (especially in writings from the period of 1938-1945), Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Guomindang (GMD), and the US (in writings from the period 1945 to compilation, editing, 
and publishing of Quotations). For example, “Its main characteristic is that Japanese 
imperialism wants to turn China into a colony... As we all know, for nearly a hundred years 
China has been a semi-colonial country jointly dominated by several imperialist powers.”142 
From this quote Mao’s definition of imperialism also included an element of an outside or 
anti-nationalist power forcing upon a sovereign people their will. In this instance, any effort 
to undermine or weaken the strength of an indigenous (presumably communist) China served 
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to further imperialism. Mao’s words advanced this conclusion when he noted, “To win 
independence and freedom for China is a great task. It demands that we fight against foreign 
imperialism and the domestic counter-revolutionary forces.”143 Thus, for Mao, imperialism 
contained a composite of economic exploitation and forceful dominance of Asia by outside, 
Western forces and their Asian.  
The following secondary sources most appropriate for understanding the role 
imperialism played regarding revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a reaction to imperialism and 
Western incursions into Asia that threatened Chinese interests in the region, included: 
Stephen Howe, Bonnie G. Smith, Michael Parenti, and Daniel Headrick because these works, 
though seemingly divorced form the subject at hand, each dealt with details intimate to the 
study and appreciation of Western imperialism (“Western” and “imperialism,” ideas near 
synonymous in Mao’s writings). In a general sense, according to Stephen Howe, the 
combined terms “empire” and “imperialism” connoted all relations between a more powerful 
political entity, specifically states or societies, and a less powerful one through 
“formal…physical control or full-fledged rule” and “informal…implied, less 
direct…dominance.”144 Such influence possibly manifested through force, diplomacy and 
political maneuvering, or information and ideas. This first element, waging war, meant that 
the political entity in question possessed a means to raise forces, be they land or maritime (or 
in modern parlance, aerospace as well), initiate military or policing actions with those forces, 
and maintain those forces in the field, id est away from the home, for an extended period. 
This second element, the legislative and executive element, while more self-descriptive, 
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possessed subtle connections to the first. This third element, information and ideas, seemed 
to be the defining cause of the death of the old empires and birth of the new empires during 
the twentieth century and, for the foreseeable future, the domain of the empires to come, as 
ideological conflicts underpinned the anti-imperialist conflicts of the Cold War. Before 
Howe, Headrick examined the interaction between imperialism, colonies, and technologies. 
Headrick emphasized the geographic “extent” and, in the case of Western European 
imperialism, the lasting technological/industrial “legacy” of imperial powers on their former 
colonies.145 The attribute of geographic extent certainly became an important feature of the 
conflict between the PRC and US as manifested during the Korean War. While both the PRC 
and the US extended their supply lines to reach the 38th Parallel, the US operated most 
distinctly outside its immediate realm in a region foreign in the starkest senses of the term.  
Economic issues appeared consistently in definitions and interpretations of 
imperialism and anti-imperialism. Modern analysts, such as Parenti, stressed that economics 
is the ultimate motivation of imperialism. According to Parenti, “the process of transnational 
investment and capital accumulation” defined imperialism.146 This interpretation fell in line 
most akin to the Marxist-Leninist appraisal of imperialism (discussed at length above), but 
seemed to have little—indeed, if any—overt connection to the Korean War, despite the 
persistent insistence of Mao Zedong to the contrary. For example, the Korean peninsula had 
little economic bearing on US-UN, USSR, or PRC interests. Rather than an accumulation of 
capital, the belligerents in the Korean War sought to accumulate the capital of “hearts and 
minds” of the populace into their respective ideological spheres of influence in East Asia in 
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order to develop favorable positions and initiative for the inevitable global clash of 
capitalism and communism. These particular circumstances aligned more with B. Smith’s 
definition of imperialism. According to B. Smith, imperialism as modern state power ensured 
“national prosperity” and the development of a sentiment that the citizens of a state believed 
their nation superior to others.147 The conflict over influence of “hearts and minds” in Korean 
exemplified B. Smith’s national superiority component of imperialism. 
The purposes for Chinese intervention in the Korean War explicated several distinct, 
anti-imperialist interests of the PRC. At the outset of the war, Chinese policy makers listed 
several reasons for the PRC’s involvement in a foreign war that included a combination of 
international and domestic concerns that sought to protect China, and by extent East Asia, 
from foreign, especially capitalist-imperialist Western influences. Mao’s October 1950 order 
to the CPVF directed Chinese troops “to support the Korea people’s war of liberation and to 
resist the attacks of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, thereby safeguarding the interests 
of the people of Korea, China and all the other countries in the East.”148 Marshal Nie 
Rongzhen, acting chief of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff and vice chairman of 
the CCP Central Military Commission and the People’s Revolutionary Committee during the 
Korean War, remarked that Beijing entered the war to “resist America and aid Korea; defend 
our nation and guard our homeland.”149 While the wording of these statements placed a 
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noticeable emphasis on protecting Chinese security, both arguments also noted the 
importance of resisting US encroachments, supporting the struggle of the communist DPRK, 
and further prevent foreign incursions into East Asia. By the conclusion of the war, Mao’s 
aims for the CPVF continued to demonstrate similar elements as found in his orders of 1950 
though the extent and nature of the conflict required adjustments of the scope and specifics of 
the terms of victory. According to Mao’s speech to the twenty-forth session of the Central 
People’s Government Council, September 12, 1953, the Chinese entered the war “to resist 
US aggression and aid Korea…a new imperialist war of aggression against China and a third 
world war have been put off.”150 Though the specifics of these statements vary, four general 
objectives appeared that characterized the nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a 
strategy well suited for anti-imperialist war. These included (1) an emphasis on “people’s 
war,” a combination of an emphasis on human power and a de-emphasis on technology and 
machines, (2) resist US encroachments in both physical and ideological forms, (3) resist 
foreign encroachments throughout East Asia, otherwise known as “internationalism,” and (4) 
protect the interests of the fledgling PRC. 
In terms of description and conduct, the actions of both the DPRK and the CPVF 
adhered to the model of “people’s war.” The term “people’s war” designated a “revolutionary 
war…a war of the masses.”151 This model applied especially well to the communist forces 
that relied on armed masses and the efforts of people, both combatant and noncombatant, 
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contrasted to complex military-political bureaucracies and military-industrial complexes such 
as the US-UN. This situation originated, at least on the part of China, because it had yet to 
develop a noteworthy industrial complex prior to the invasion of the Japanese in 1938 and 
continued to struggle in this arena following the domestic instability of war caused by both 
the conflict against the Japanese and later the GMD.152 Overtly, the supposed differentiation 
in technological capability, specifically found in differences of military hardware, defines—
and at times inspires—revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Mao stressed the disparity in 
technological capability between the CPVF and the US in speech that commemorated the 
victory of the CPVF. According to Mao, “We fought U.S. imperialism, an enemy wielding 
weapons many times superior to ours, and yet we were able to win and compelled it to agree 
to a truce.”153 During the Korean War, the PLA, and by extension the CPVF, possessed a 
myriad of arms that ranged from Soviet supplied weapons, “liberated” arms captured from 
the GMD (often of US manufacture), and additional arms collected from the retreating 
imperial Japanese forces. Compared to the DPRK, the CPVF seemed to operate under a more 
textbook example of this disparity between industrialized and anti-imperialist forces. When 
PLA forces entered North Korea, they found their communist allies possessed better and 
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more arms, supplied by the USSR.154 Thus, the CPVF found itself operating under quite 
strained conditions with regards to their own manufacture and supply of weapons. Mao 
requested significant quantities of arms, ammunition, and explosives from Stalin in 
November, 1950, to reduce the despairing gap between the PLA and the US-UN. This 
request included 140,000 Soviet rifles with 58,000,000 rounds, 26,000 sub-machine guns 
with 80,000,000 rounds, 7,000 light machine guns with 37,000,000 rounds, 2,000 heavy 
machine guns with 20,000,000 rounds, and 1,000 tons of TNT.155 The overall technological 
and manufacturing differences, when taken as a whole assessment of the capabilities of both 
sides, stood in stark contrast to one another. The CPVF, on the one hand, either relied on 
inconsistent and mixed weapons from a variety of sources. The US-UN, especially the US, 
possessed complex, reliable, and predictable means of manufacturing that could, when 
necessary, develop and implement weapons ranging from common small arms to advanced 
weapons of mass destruction such as atomic weapons.  
Beyond clearly superior US-UN airpower, some advantages in artillery, and nuclear 
strike capability, the average weapons, employed by average soldiers, for the majority of the 
conflict possessed relative parity throughout the duration of the war. The technological 
differences between the CPVF and the US-UN in capability on a limited war battlefield such 
as that of the Korean War spanned a shorter distance than during previous confrontations 
between China and the West. In the first instance, the battlefield weapons of the period 
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performed little different from those used during the closing days of World War II. 
Furthermore, once the CPVF engaged US-UN forces, Chinese troops made concerted efforts 
throughout the war to capture or salvage US-UN manufactured weapons. According to Mao, 
soldiers were to “replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captures 
from the enemy.”156 The significant technologically based differentiation of this conflict 
resided not in the products of technology, but the technologies of industry and manufacturing 
that the belligerents possessed. While the CPVF managed to provide minimal supplies and 
salvage what it could not self-supply, the disparaging differentiation in technological ability 
lay in China’s home agrarian economy. 
The CMC, well aware of this disparity, committed to battle against the industrially 
superior US-UN but not without an appreciable counter-strategy. For all the assets the PRC 
lacked, manpower composed the most significant natural resource the PRC possessed to 
commit to battle in Korea.157 Mao recognized this military resource first during his war 
against the Japanese Imperial Army and, later, during the Chinese Civil War. In both of these 
conflicts, the Red Army armed and equipped based on the weapons and provisions it 
acquired from forage and salvage. Without the assistance of industry, the Red Army relied on 
the individual abilities of guerrillas and, more often than not, on their sheer numbers. Despite 
the difficulties these circumstances created, they were not the determining factors in victory. 
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According to Mao’s observations from 1936, “A military strategist cannot overstep the 
limitations imposed by the material conditions; within these limitations, however, he can and 
must strive for victory.”158 This proscription deemphasized the importance of technology and 
industry in attaining military victory, contrary to the consistent measure of such as indicators 
in Western military culture, and thereby disarming the seemingly invulnerable juggernaut. 
This neither meant that guerrillas did not seek to improve their material situation nor that the 
PRC did not attempt to improve its industrial and manufacturing capabilities. In a 1946 
interview with American journalist Anna Louise Strong, Mao noted, “…the outcome of war 
is decided by the people, not by one or two new weapons.”159 Though the GMD stood as 
Mao’s primary struggle at the time, in this quote he referred specifically to the US and their 
recent development and implementation of atomic weapons in 1945. Whether because of US 
support of the GMD or concern of US encroachments into Asia, Mao made careful 
assessments of his strategies against the Japanese and GMD out of concern for armed conflict 
with the West. 
 When faced with the overwhelming industrial capability of the US-UN, the 
communist forces required intense, ideological reinforcement. Mao referred to this as 
“revolutionary spirit,” described in a variety of terms. One particularly fitting description 
equated revolutionary spirit with “courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, 
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and continuous fighting.”160 In another, more culturally driven assessment, Mao wrote, “We 
the Chinese nation have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of our blood...”161 These 
descriptions encouraged the CPVF to draw upon individual pride in themselves and national 
pride in the long tradition of China for courage in the face of their foreign enemies. 
Furthermore, when dealing with irregular, revolutionary guerrilla forces drawn from the 
masses, the revolutionary leadership had to compensate by instilling their troops with an ad 
hoc and easily appreciable discipline and motivation. 
 Often, this inspiration originated and perpetuated in ideological education. 
Educational models and institutions served an essential role in Mao’s models of 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare because of the intense need for galvanizing political 
ideologies, or to use the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, create political awareness, in the masses. 
Revolutionary guerrilla forces required extensive political indoctrination, to ensure that the 
decentralized manner of this combat did not disintegrate into roving bandits that threatened 
the political unity of the larger revolutionary guerrilla effort and the masses.162 As such, the 
PLA created a “primary school” for numerous soldiers who had a desire and a need to learn 
Chinese writing in order to understand Communist propaganda.163 Furthermore, warfare and 
conflict, especially against the US-UN, provided opportunities to increase the political 
awareness of the PRC and CCP.164 Because of the ideological conflict inherent between the 
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competing powers of the Korean War, continued to ensure a political consciousness among 
the people served a continually indispensable necessity. It furthermore provided the PRC an 
opportunity to spread its influence, be it as a communist power or an Asian power in Asia, in 
opposition to the encroachments of the US-UN. This political awareness that originated in 
China and spread through Chinese involvement established and maintained ideological 
domination that proved especially important in the power vacuum that followed the 
dismantling of Imperial Japan that itself largely destabilized the previous European imperial 
systems in Asia established nearly a century earlier. 
 The CPVF required one last essential element of “people’s war”—the support of the 
people. In general, according to Mao the revolutionary guerrilla army must “become one 
with the people so that they see it as their own army.”165 In a more artistic and perhaps better-
known allegory, Mao described the relationship between the masses and revolutionary 
guerrilla forces as one where “the former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish 
who inhabit it.”166 This model of cooperation served to develop ideological, cultural, and 
nationalistic ties between the revolutionary guerrilla forces and the surrounding masses while 
at the same time creating fissures in the pro-Western supporting camps by highlighting the 
differences between the forces.  
While doctrinally this seemed especially powerful against the foreign US-UN powers, 
in practice on the Korean Peninsula a number of difficulties surfaced. Just as they did in 
China during the wars against the Japanese and the GMD, the soldiers of the CPVF had to 
subsist off the benevolence of the Korean people. The sheer number of CPVF soldiers in 
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Korea ranged from 300,000 and greater than one million throughout the course of the war. 
While the entire PLA contained many times this number of troops, the massing of so many 
Chinese soldiers in addition to the DPRK forces, placed a considerable logistical burden on 
the Korean people. What’s more, the war had already drained the Korean people of many 
resources by the time of the CPVF’s arrival some five months after the DPRK crossed the 
38th Parallel in June 1950. No matter how strong their communist ideological bonds or their 
anti-Western sentiments, the Korean people could not provide every means of support. 
According to Wang Xuedong, a CPVF soldier, 
“We had to take with us whatever we needed, or whatever we could carry on our 
shoulders. When our regiment ran out of food, we had to trade our blankets, towels, 
and even medicines with local Koreans for their rice, corn, and vegetables.”167  
 
While Mao discussed the importance of cooperation between the revolutionary guerrilla 
forces and the people of the countryside, the picture created by Chinese soldiers contained an 
air of desperation, as CPVF troops traded their supplies for necessities. Furthermore, the 
mere presence of the CPVF troops and the tensions they placed on Korean infrastructures 
strained the morale of the Korean people. According to a periodic intelligence report 
published by the US 45th Infantry Division, the North Koreans were not pleased with the 
presence of the CPVF, though this attitude varied with age and location. A deserter of the 
CPVF informed US forces that the Koreans held attitudes towards the Chinese troops as 
“generally cold.”168 These attitudes highlight the inconsistent attitudes of communists 
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towards gaining assistance from outside powers, thereby calling into question the perceived 
unity within the Comintern. 
 Following their hard fought victory in the Pacific in 1945, coupled with competing 
interests in the region, the US sought to maintain its national and ideological prosperity in the 
face of Soviet encroachments in Asia that threatened to weaken the US presence in the 
region. Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the US created made concerted 
efforts to create a defensible perimeter in the Pacific to protect US interests. Furthermore, the 
infamous National Security Council document, NSC-68, outlined the official policy of the 
US towards international relations “as one designed to foster a world environment in which 
the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and 
affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community.”169 Born from the 
competition between the USSR and US, this policy thrust the US into Asia as it attempted to 
preserve its interests—a maneuver that brought it into direct confrontation with the PRC. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech to the National Press Club, January 12, 1950, 
outlined a defensive perimeter “along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the 
Ryukyus.”170 This speech outlined a specific, territorial border of US interests and influence 
that occupied several foreign territories. It not only explicated the extent to which US 
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influence encroached into Asia, but also held qualities reminiscent of foreign powers carving 
out territories in the region. 
Even when spiked with the sharpest ideological rhetoric, the claim that imperialism 
embodied “expansion as an end in itself,” as Howe described it.171 This doubt arose simply 
because of the cost and labor involved in the establishment and maintenance of imperialist 
systems. Furthermore, when examined from the perspective of a military history, and when 
compared with the leading philosophers on military thought and theory of Europe in the 
nineteenth century (most notably Clausewitz) or the founders of Chinese models (most 
notably Sunzi), the undertakings of hostilities, a prime means of expanding imperialism, is a 
risky, costly, and purposeless endeavor.172 Clausewitz, for example, emphasized that warfare 
is a matter of state, an expansion of policy by armed means and not something ex nihilo.173 
Sunzi also emphasized the dangers of engaging in warfare foolishly, especially in a time of 
expansion and conquest seeking to establish hegemonic imperial power over competing 
states.174 By the initiation of hostilities of the Korean War, the US possessed all of the 
industrial resources necessary to carryout global military operations for an extended period of 
time and found nothing, resource wise, to gain from Korea. China, on the other hand, needed 
desperately assistance from the USSR to rearm and reequip the People’s Liberation Army 
following the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949, as well as to develop lasting industrial 
infrastructures. Even so, neither country had an immediate, measurable interest, in exploiting 
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Korea of its economic resources; Korea possessed control and influence over trade routes. 
According to “The Position of the United States With Respect to Asia, NSC-48/2,” as of 
1949, the US actively sought to deny the USSR and DPRK “strategic materials and 
equipment” through Chinese channels of gain and “prevent the Chinese Communists from 
obtaining from non-Soviet sources supplies of materials and equipment of direct military 
utility.”175 
Korea possessed a divided arena of “hearts and minds” wherein the US-UN could 
carve a significant sphere of anti-communist influence in Asia and create a foothold on the 
eastern flank of the USSR, thereby creating a multi-hemisphere pincer. What’s more, a US 
presence on the Korean peninsula coupled with their support for the GMD on Taiwan 
threatened the PRC’s political influence in Asia and industrial sectors or northeast China.176 
It seemed to Peng that the positioning of the US in Asia indicated larger designs aimed at 
China.177 This assessment found validity in part because forces intent on invading China 
throughout history entered the continent though Korea. On two previous occasions, during 
the sixteenth century and the twentieth century, Japanese forces that sought to conquer China 
began their wars with the acquisition of Korea. Considering the fervent anti-communist and 
pro-GMD position of the US, it was not unreasonable for the PRC to fear this presence, 
especially because the US possessed nuclear attack capability and long-range delivery 
platforms that operated in the skies over Korea. If the US controlled Korea, the possibility of 
a nuclear strike on major cities in China, notably Beijing, loomed a dreadful possibility. 
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According to Mao, the presence of “the American invaders” in Korea created circumstances 
that allowed the US ever increasing control of the region, “such a situation would be very 
unfavorable to the whole East.”178 
 Mao argued in his military writings that revolutionary guerrilla wars served to 
complete a larger revolution in Asia. According to Mao, “wars of national liberation 
patriotism is applied internationalism.”179 In Mao’s essay “Patriotism and Internationalism,” 
he emphasized the importance of “patriotism,” action that sought to develop China, and 
“internationalism,” support of anti-imperialist efforts abroad.180 What Mao describes as 
“internationalism” defined terms from studies military and diplomatic as “joint” or “shared 
interests” between state and political powers.181 Prior to the DPRK’s crossing of the 38th 
Parallel, China transferred a number of Korean troops in the PLA to Korea under the 
command of Koreans.182 This international cooperation manifested during the Korean War as 
a “people’s war,” where “the whole nation [of China] gave it support and the people of China 
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and Korean fought shoulder to shoulder.”183 Policy makers and the CPVF shared this 
perception. Zheng Yanman, a CPVF soldier, referred to the efforts to maintain his defensive 
bunkers as endeavors to preserve the territory of North Korea, as opposed to China or 
Communist spheres of influence, and deny the Americans this territory: “The hill belongs to 
North Korea as long as we keep it in our hands.”184 While the soldiers possessed a more 
personal connection to the struggles of the DPRK, likely forged from their direct 
participation in the conflict, internationalism also contained a subtle implication of the 
spreading of PRC influence throughout East Asia. From the essays and speeches of Mao also 
came implications that this idea of “internationalism” represented a broadening of the 
influence of Chinese Communism across Asia. For example, Mao exercised great care to 
explain, “It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every 
Chinese Communist must learn...” that makes “a foreigner selflessly adopt the cause of the 
Chinese people’s liberation.”185 Furthermore, though Mao proscribed an obligation to assist 
other Asian states in their struggles and requiring the assistance of the PRC demonstrated 
military and political weakness. According to Mao, “In the fight for complete liberation the 
oppressed people rely first of all on their own struggle and then, and only then, on 
international assistance.”186 This idea of self-reliance before assistance implied an inability to 
successfully carryout a revolutionary struggle and, by requesting assistance, placed the PRC 
in a position as superior entity, not unlike the ancient tributary system. Furthermore, this 
conclusion complemented Smith’s assessment that stronger states require influence over 
                                                          
183 Mao, “Victory.” 
184 Zheng, Yanman. “The Chinese go Underground,” in Voices from the Korean War: 
Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers (Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 2004), 175. 
185 Mao, “Patriotism and Internationalism,” 176-177. 
186 Mao, “Patriotism and Internationalism,” 176-177. 
82 
neighboring states for security. According to Smith, “In such cases, the interests of border 
security and trade relations always require that the more civilized state have a certain 
authority over its neighbors, whose wild and unruly customs render them very 
troublesome.”187 This idea also manifested in the policies of PRC. While the language of 
PRC policy towards entry into the Korean War spoke of foreign powers in terms of 
communist lexicons and US imperialism, the connotations contained reminiscences of 
imperial relations between China and tributary states. While the PRC did not have, initially, 
the economic, political, or military prestige as Imperial China it did have a proven ability to 
assist other Asian, especially communist, societies overcome outside, especially Western, 
influences. Mao and his methods of revolutionary guerrilla warfare not only greatly 
contributed to the defeat of the imperial Japanese forces in China, but also defeated the US 
supported GMD in the Chinese Civil War. Furthermore, entrance in the Korean War 
provided the PRC an opportunity to directly, if only subtly, test the mettle of the PLA against 
the US-UN. China presented to the former colonies of Western imperialism in Asia the 
commodity of access to Chinese thoughts and theories, as in previous eras. Specifically, in 
the twentieth century, the PRC traded Mao’s theory of revolutionary guerrilla warfare that, 
between 1937 and 1970, demonstrated a consistent ability to cause significant complications 
to Western models of warfare, for increased influence. 
Above all else in the interests of the PRC, avoidance of another “imperialist war of 
aggression against China,” held the highest concern.188 When viewed through the traditional 
interpretive lenses of the US historiography of the Korean War as a limited war of the larger 
conflict between the US and the USSR, the concerns and the conflict of the PRC with the US 
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took a secondary role of inquiry. This assessment, however, overlooked a key element of not 
only traditional Chinese approaches to warfare, but also an expansion of this approach to suit 
the anti-imperialist nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Often, imperial powers viewed 
the coming of their banners, their ways of life, their systems of government, and their 
ideologies as blessings of civilization to “barbarian” people on the periphery of society.189 
Whiting argued that the rise of the PRC and its adherence to communism “drastically 
modified a traditional Chinese admonition to ‘use barbarians to control barbarians.’”190 To 
quell barbarians by using other barbarians, Chinese states sought to buy them off with 
products of Chinese or pitted them against each other in an effort to wear down the martial 
abilities of both while preserving Chinese defensibility. In light of the entirety of the Cold 
War and with access to Chinese and Soviet documents, the PRC indeed employed a variation 
of the “barbarians to control barbarians” strategy. During the Cold War, as in previous eras, 
foreign entities threatened China’s security, self-determination, and influence in Asia. While 
Beijing proved unable to bait the two “barbarians,” the US and USSR, into significant open 
conflict with one another, it did gain from the USSR desperately needed military and 
industrial resources and expertise in order to compete with the West, an exchange made 
easier by the intense competition between the two “barbarians.” Furthermore, the greater and 
more direct Soviet involvement in the Korean War, the greater the likelihood of armed 
conflict between the USSR and US in the region. This threat brought with it the possibility 
that either power could attempt to carve out regions of physical control in northeast China, 
not only depriving China of the industry and manufacturing in the area, but also reopening it 
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to the potential of colonization, reminiscent of the ending days of the Qing.191 Considering 
the later breakdown of relations between the USSR and the PRC, it became clear that the two 
powers were not united as strongly in their communist ideologies US-UN observers 
predicted. 
Memories and fears of a resurgent Imperial Japan also stoked PRC concerns leading 
up to and continuing long after the Korean War. As the war carried on, the US further altered 
the military balance of power in the region to maintain spheres of influence and a defensible 
perimeter that resulted in a rearming effort in Japan.192 Because of increased communist 
influence in East Asia, the US adopted a total reversal of Allied policy towards Japan in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II. Japan possessed a remarkable ability to adapt to the 
imperialist model of the West produced during the nineteenth century. Furthermore, as the 
US took a solitary role as the guide of Japanese post-War occupation, Chinese fears of 
“American imperialism rearming Japanese militarism” grew.193 When discussing the merits 
of rearming Japan, General Robert Eichelberger appraised the Japanese soldier, 
Dollar for dollar there is no cheaper fighting man in the world than the Japanese. He 
is already a veteran. His food is simple. His uniform can be manufactured in Japan 
[…] this man, if armed, could defend his country from internal uprisings or in the last 
analysis his country from invasion […] Japanese soldiers would be a commander’s 
dream.194 
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In 1948 Eichelberger recommended to Secretary of State George Marshall that an ideal 
rearmed Japan raise a 200,000 man strong army, medium-sized navy including small aircraft 
carriers, and an air force of at least 100 aircraft.195 One proposal advocated that Japan should 
create a standing army of 300,000 to 325,000 fighting men in ten fully equipped combat 
divisions by 1953 to serve as a support for noncommunist Asia.196 With a sizable US military 
presence in the region, and fears that the US prepared to rearm Japan on a scale competitive 
with the imperial Japanese Army, the PRC had significant cause to feel their ideological 
interests threatened. In addition to concerns about overt military interactions between the US 
and Japan against China, the cooperation between the periphery entity of Japan and the US in 
a subversive manner concerned Mao. In Mao’s speech at the twenty-fourth session of the 
Central People’s Government Council “Our Great Victory in the War to Resist US 
Aggression and Aid Korea and Our Future Tasks,” September 12, 1953, he noted that, 
despite the victory of the CPVF in Korea, places within the US spheres of influence still 
threatened Chinese interests. According to Mao: 
“The enemy may resume the war, and even if he doesn't, he is sure to make trouble in 
all sorts of ways, such as by sending in secret agents to carry out wrecking activities. 
He has set up a vast network of secret services in places like Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Japan.”197 
 
For Mao, and by extension the PRC, the continued presence of foreign powers in Asia 
threatened the security of China. 
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 The timing of the Cold War and the rapid decolonization of the world, both beginning 
in the mid-1940s, created a set of circumstances that “intertwined” the two phenomena.198 
Nationalist movements often rose to the forefront as former colonies sought to determine 
their own destinies following the casting away of foreign yokes of control and exploitation. 
The absence of a significant, and stable, political structures in East Asia in the wake of the 
dismantling of the majority of European and Japanese colonial possessions following World 
War II, as well as the prime competing ideologies of communism and capitalism turned 
Asia—both metaphorically and literally—into a battlefield. While nationalism provided a 
basic unifying idea to muster the indigenous masses, it did not provide a means to revolution. 
Marxism-Leninism provided an ideological means to an end, but only in a limited sense. 
Focused primarily on economics and social structures, Marxism-Leninism had little to say 
regarding the use of ideology in conjunction with military operations to bring about socio-
political change. Perhaps this lack of literature, in itself, resulted from the determinist model 
of Marxist history that argued that all societies eventually rise to overthrow their oppressive, 
capitalist ruling class. It also provided an alternative model of governance as a reaction or 
antithesis to the capitalist colonial administrators. It failed to provide, however, a clear means 
to achieve these goals.199 Mao provided, however, an idea and a method to overcome 
remnant imperial powers, and the incursions of the US and USSR specifically designed to 
capitalize on nationalist sentiments and adapt to the strengths and weaknesses of anti-
imperialist revolutionary guerrilla warfare. This total approach to anti-imperialism provided 
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Mao not merely control of Beijing, but also a means to spread Chinese influence throughout 
East Asia. According to Mao, “under no condition, remain content with the overthrow of 
imperialism in China, but, on the contrary, will, as its ultimate objective, aim at waging a war 
against world imperialism until the latter is all blown up.”200 The time did come, however, 
when Asian states had to choose whether to follow the PRC or USSR, but these conflicts are 
matters for other investigations. As in previous imperial periods, the PRC spread its influence 
throughout Asia through the diffusion of ideology and philosophy. Previously, 
Confucianism, Daoism, art, writing, and the various other products of wen (“culture”) spread 
Chinese influence. In the 1950s, the influence of the PRC extend through a combination of a 
uniting Communist ideology, a touch of anti-Western Imperialist/pro-Asian sentiments, and 
the military thought and theory of Chairman Mao. 
 No matter the advances man makes, no tool—be it weapon or device—can overcome 
the central element of all human endeavors: humans. It is ultimately the red eyes and tear-
stained cheeks of mothers that witness the horrors of war, the cries of children that echo in 
ears longer than the bursts of shells, and the hands of men that bear the blood drained of the 
enemy. Even so, no matter how secure a head of state, stout a soldier, or greedy an 
industrialist, the sources of initiative in this grand struggle of interests and influences are 
information and ideals. Information is the currency, commodity, and the lifeblood of states. 
For all of the power of words and ideas in an age where access to information is greater than 
ever before, where literacy is no longer as rare as before, the use of ideas to establish and 
overthrow powers is not new. “Information is ammunition” and the means to motivate 
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masses to commit to the subjugation or overthrow of power.201 As George Orwell noted with 
the motto of INGSOC in his dystopian novel, 1984, “He who controls the present, controls 
the past. He who controls the past, controls the future.” The control of information is a key to 
establish or overthrow imperial power. Not merely, as Orwell noted, censorship and 
propaganda, but also the use of information (specifically ideology, thought, theory, and 
philosophy) to spread influence and encourage subservience or rebellion as the case may be. 
Those with access, control, and understanding of this are the imperial powers to come. As 
proven the case during the early 1950s as the PRC attempted to spread its influence (both as 
a communist state and the central state in Asia—pun on Middle Kingdom intended) just as it 
is today as Western defense and intelligence analysts worry over the possibility of a PLA 
information attack via computer networks. This is especially the case of the empires of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as the US and USSR sought to purchase, persuade, or 
purloin the “hearts and minds” of people across the globe with information and ideology. 
What’s more, the peoples of East Asia, tired of colonial rule, found in these two competitors 
an opportunity to gain independence from outside rule and, with the aid of the PRC and 
Mao’s military thoughts and theories, East Asian states resisted US attempts to create spheres 
of influence.  
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FROM BOOKS TO BOOTS 
PUTTING MAO’S THEORIES INTO PRACTICE IN KOREA202 
 
Revolutionary guerrilla war, id est unorthodox war, formed the central guiding 
doctrine of both the Red Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) throughout the early 
decades of the twentieth century and into the initial years of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). This doctrine included ideas such as the primacy of the human numbers and effort, 
the potency of ideological motivation, drawing out the enemy’s forces, finances, and will to 
fight, and surprise attacks on isolated forces to overcome the superior technology and 
firepower of United States and United Nations (US-UN) forces. Though this model assisted 
the Red Army achieve military success against both the imperial Japanese and Guimindang 
Chinese Nationalists (GMD) in the previous decade’s conflicts, it required modification 
during the Korean War to combat “a well-trained force with high morale equipped with 
modern weapons and possessing the will and the skill to use those weapons” such as the US-
UN in a foreign land.203 Throughout the initial phases of the five campaigns conducted by the 
Chinese People Volunteer Forces (CPVF), traditional elements of revolutionary guerrilla war 
directed and influenced military doctrine persistently. Employed by the CPVF. As the war 
continued, however, the limitations of revolutionary guerrilla war, most notably limited 
supply, limited communications and a reliance on Beijing for operations guidance, and 
inconsistency of weapons types limited the advantages the CPVF enjoyed and proved 
insufficient to overcome US-UN forces completely. That said, considering the situation in 
which the CPVF found itself during the Korean War, the doctrine of revolutionary guerrilla 
                                                          
202 The core of this chapter appeared in “Mao’s Revolutionary Strategy and the Korean War,” 
American Review of China Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 & Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 2011 & Spring 
2012). 
203 Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, G3091 Korea TS (Section III) JCS 
1924/17, 11 July 1950, National Archives, Washington. 
90 
war and the adaptations there to it employed proved sufficient that the PRC and PLA could, 
if tested in an armed conflict against the US-UN, hold their own and at a minimum create a 
stalemate in a foreign land, and by implication, create a costly war for foreign aggressors 
who dared invade China.  
 The Central Military Committee (CMC) of the PRC chose to adopt revolutionary 
guerrilla war as the basis for operations in Korea for a number of reasons. According to Peng 
Dehuai, commander of the CPVF, “If the Americans decided to fight against us, a quick war 
would be favorable to them, but a protracted one to us; regular warfare would be favorable to 
them but the methods [of revolutionary guerrilla war] that we had used to deal with the 
Japanese would be favorable to us.”204 Many members of the CMC such as Peng and Nie 
Rongzhen served with the Red Army during its campaigns against Japan and the GMD. With 
the multitude of similarities of the oppositional forces and the continuity of abilities of the 
PLA, Chinese military leaders found it best to operate in Korea under Mao’s model of 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare in the hopes of repeating their previous success. They based 
these hopes on their knowledge that US-UN forces, like the imperial Japanese, operated with 
extended supply lines that required maritime or airborne transport. Indeed, many elements of 
the US forces came to Korea from staging points based in Japan. While the CPVF could not 
threaten these supply lines because of their nature of transport, the extended nature did limit 
the amount of supplies that the US-UN could bring to Korea at one time because shipping 
tonnage. Furthermore, transporting resources by sea and air required substantial resources in 
terms of manufacturing, maintenance, and fuel. The secondary nature of the Korean theater 
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to US interests compared to those in Europe further this situation, as the Washington 
funneled more resources to Europe. Understandably, the CMC expected the US-UN forces to 
seek a quick victory through superior technology in order to compensate for the limitations of 
extended supply lines and limited numbers. Moreover, though industrially advanced in 
comparison to the PRC, to maintain these more complex machines came at a cost, as such 
machines required greater resources to construct, maintain, and repair. If nothing else, a 
protracted, defensive campaign carried out on the part of the CPVF and NKPA would cause 
the conflict in Korea to be too expensive monetarily for the UN to execute for an extended 
period.  
 Furthermore, the PRC lacked significant industrial and manufacturing centers to 
produce weapons and munitions for the PLA. These limitations upon Chinese troops made 
the prospects of engaging the US-UN forces in conventional combat unnecessarily 
dangerous. This is not to suggest that the PLA did not possess useful weapons. During the 
course of the war against Japan and the Chinese Civil War, the Red Army salvaged a number 
of Japanese and American made weapons and received some assistance from the Soviet 
Union (USSR). This was, however, according to military planners in Beijing insufficient to 
meet the needs of the PLA and CPVF in Korea in terms of firepower and especially logistics. 
In November of 1950, Mao requested significant quantities of arms, ammunition, and 
explosives from Stalin. This request included 140,000 Soviet rifles with 58,000,000 rounds, 
26,000 sub-machine guns with 80,000,000 rounds, 7,000 light machine guns with 37,000,000 
founds, 2,000 heavy machine guns with 20,000,000 rounds, and 1,000 tons of TNT.205 
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Obtaining further battlefield salvage from US-UN troops provided additional up-to-date 
weaponry, but brought with it complexities in supplying ammunition and parts. 
Despite these myriad shortcomings, the PRC did not lack one crucial element of 
Mao’s model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare—manpower. According to Mao, “…the 
outcome of war is decided by the people, not by one or two new weapons.”206 During all five 
campaigns of the CPVF in the Korean War, Chinese forces enjoyed significant numerical 
advantages over their adversaries. This was a point on which Mao was notably passionate. 
Due to the relatively minimal industrial development of the PRC at the time of the Korean 
War, This decision represented a matter of doctrine adapted to pragmatism. It furthermore 
reflected continuity with a larger Chinese military precept of the primacy of the ability and 
concerns of the masses. This emphasis on greater numbers and the superiority of manpower 
over technology, coupled with emphasis on revolutionary spirit combined as essential to 
overcome any disparity of arms.207  
Considering the political, economic, and industrial affairs in China between 1949 and 
1950, it is not surprising that initially United States intelligence services were convinced that 
China would not interfere with a war in Korea.208 The dust had only begun to settle in Beijing 
behind the boots of the Red Army before Mao announced his support of North Korea’s 
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struggle in October 1949.209  A war in Korea, however, gave the PRC an opportunity to flex 
its military muscle and establish a reputation as a competitive military power, especially 
against the exemplar imperialist-Western power, according to Mao’s rhetoric from the time. 
Peng asked of the CMC, “Who could [we] show our power and strength if we did not send 
our forces to aid and save Korea?”210 According to Mao, to provoke a war with the US was 
like “prodding the tiger’s buttocks.”211 Though dangerous, a victory against the UN in Korea 
held the potential to demonstrate the potency of the newly formed PLA. In addition, a 
Chinese victory over an assembly of Western powers could show the world that the days of a 
militarily weak China were over, a change that would regain China international influence 
and restore national-cultural pride. This possible victory demonstrated not merely the ability 
of the PRC to defend itself against Western, anti-communist, forces, but also the Communist 
Bloc. A Chinese victory revealed to other communist countries, especially the USSR, that the 
PRC possessed capabilities worthy of their respect that made a valuable addition to the larger 
collection of communist states.  
 While Mao held ideas of supporting the socialist cause abroad and testing the military 
might of the PLA against the UN, Peng and Nie considered the military security of the PRC 
to be most important deciding factor in entering the war. Peng and Nie shared the idea that 
the Korean War was “forced” upon the PRC when the UN forces advanced towards the Yalu 
River.212 According to Peng, the United States presence on the Korean peninsula coupled 
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with their support for the GMD on Taiwan threatened the PRC’s political influence in Asia 
and industrial sectors or northeast China.213 It seemed to Peng that the positioning of the US 
in the Pacific were merely steps in a larger scheme to invade China.214 
 Like any protracted revolutionary guerrilla war, a Chinese operation in Korea 
required extensive preparation. Accordingly, the PRC began preparations for war in Korea 
long before the PLA reached the Yalu River. Between late 1949 and early 1950, China 
executed a number of preparatory political and military maneuvers to demonstrate their 
intention to enter the war. The two most important preparations conducive to the 
revolutionary nature of the PRC’s approach to the potential war in Korea were the agreement 
to share intelligence and the construction of additional telephone and telegraph lines.215 At 
the request of Zhou Enlai, premier of the PRC and vice chairman of the CMC, these lines of 
communication further increased with the construction of telephone lines connecting the 
DPRK and PRC.216 Although a general technological disadvantage characterized—at times 
point of pride—revolutionary guerrilla war, not possessing communication technologies 
would have put the CPVF and DPRK at a significant disadvantage. While Peng commanded 
the CPVF on the ground in Korea, Mao retained a considerable amount of control over the 
planning and implementation of the various phases of the war. So much so, that Mao 
personally decided the timing, style, and direction of the five campaigns. This made the 
process of creating operational plans a difficult and prolonged affair. Based on the situation 
in Korea, the general staff drafted plans and then submitted these plans to Mao and the CMC 
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for review and editing, which, following revision, were dispatched to units in the field.217 In 
order for communications from Mao and the CMC to reach Peng in time to be effective in 
combat, reliable and secure communication means between the field and Beijing were 
necessary and thus had to be in place before revolutionary operations commenced.  
On July 7, 1950, the same day as the United Nations passed a resolution to aid the 
Republic of Korea against the invasion of the DPRK the CMC authorized the creation of the 
Northeast Border Defense Army (NBDA).218 These conventional forces served to reinforce 
the Chinese-Korean border if a revolutionary guerrilla war in Korea proved ineffective. Mao 
and many other leaders of the PRC learned during their struggle against the Japanese and the 
GMD that guerrilla forces did not possess the abilities to carry out all forms of combat 
operations. Thus, the PLA required conventional forces in order to achieve complete victory 
over their foes. Shortly after the creation of the NBDA, in September of 1950, the CMC 
established four air force regiments, three tank brigades, and eighteen antiaircraft artillery 
units for PLA’s defense of China.219 Consistent with the view of the supremacy of 
revolutionary guerrilla war under their operational circumstances, few of these assets (most 
notably, air assets) ever engaged UN forces in Korea, instead remaining nearby to guard the 
PRC from an expansion of hostilities. 
 During the five campaigns the CPVF conducted during the Korean War, Chinese 
military doctrine experienced a number of alterations due to unique situational differences 
between the two regions of combat, yet the PLA doctrine demonstrated a remarkable 
adaptation of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. These changes occurred with time, often in the 
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middle of battle or immediately following defeat rather than in military schools or think 
tanks.220 Because of the lengthy time involved in transmitting information from the 
battlefield to Beijing and back, commanders had to make battlefield decisions quickly. 
Decisions about major operations, however, remained the prerogative of Mao. The most 
successful example of the continuation of revolutionary guerrilla warfare into the Korean 
War occurred during the First Campaign (October 19, 1950-October 25, 1950). On October 
19, 1950, the CPVF crossed the Yalu River in order to engage nearby Republic of Korea 
(ROK) units and advancing US forces. Despite the resources of the NBDA, the CMC sent 
only infantry and limited artillery support into Korea. This decision represented the CMC’s 
decision to wage a discrete revolutionary style of war instead of attempting to compete in a 
conventional war with the UN. The forces originally dispatched to Korea in October 1950 
included six infantry armies and three artillery divisions for a total of 300,000 men. By 
November of that same year, the number of Chinese troops swelled to 450,000 men. 
Exploiting a significant resource of the PRC, Peng designed CPVF operations around the 
principle of numerical superiority221 to compensate technological inferiority between CPVF-
KPA and the US-UN forces.222 The initial CPVF force of 300,000 that crossed the Yalu 
River in October 1950 faced approximately 130,000 UN troops—an advantage of more than 
two to one. 223 This numerical superiority built upon Mao’s tactics to attack only when 
superior numbers contributed to the possibilities of victory, most often as a means to 
compensate for insufficient mechanized support.  
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 Once within the Korean border, the CPVF achieved success against American, 
British, and South Korean troops at once. Using local superiority of numbers, surprise, 
feigned retreats, and human wave tactics, the CPVF made great advances between October 
21 and October 25, 1950.224 During this four-day assault, the CPVF defeated ROK troops at 
Puckchin-Unsan and later pushed forces of all three nations south to the Chongchon River 
and Tokchon. On October 25, 1950, nearly 100,000 CPVF troops attacked two ROK 
divisions (between 20,000 and 30,000 troops) south of the Yalu River. In the process, the 
CPVF inflicted nearly 1,000 casualties, routed the survivors, and then retreated into the 
mountains.225 This phase made extensive use of Mao’s principles of operations in 
revolutionary guerrilla war: 
“Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first…make wiping out the enemy’s 
effective strength our main objective…in every battle, concentrate an absolutely 
superior force  (two, three, four, and sometimes even five or six times the enemy’s 
strength), encircle the  enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly 
and do not let any escape from the net.”226  
 
These principles manifested in CPVF’s use of superior numbers and surprise attacks to 
overwhelm technological advantages of the US supported ROK forces, as well as feigned 
retreats in order to draw overconfident US-UN forces out and attack the weakly defended 
flanks and rear.227 During these small engagements, CPVF troops multiplied the force of 
their already considerable superiority of numbers as they isolated pockets of overextended 
UN forces. In addition to draining manpower, these attacks provided the CPVF an 
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opportunity to gain battlefield salvage, which could in turn produce better weapons and 
equipment, a key tenet of Mao’s revolutionary guerrilla war.228 Like any successful 
revolutionary army, the CPVF did not stay in the field long after battle. In order to preserve 
as much of their force as remained, the CPVF retreated into the mountains to consolidate 
their forces and take up defensive positions against a possible reprisal. The mountains 
provided additional defensive strengths as the CPVF needed to hide from the prying eyes of 
US-UN air assets—something the Red Army did not need to concern itself with during the 
Chinese Civil War.   
 During the Second Campaign (November 25, 1950-December 24, 1950), the CPVF 
continued their practices of revolutionary guerrilla war such as luring the enemy in deep, 
attacking the flanks in order to attack the front, and relying on numbers to overcome 
technological disparities.229 In response to General MacArthur’s “end the war” offensive of 
November 1950, Peng ordered the CPVF to withdraw their battle lines 30 kilometers north 
and form a defensive Unsan-Kusong line to lie in ambush on favorable terrain to face the 
advance of US-UN forces.230 Throughout the early stages of the Second Campaign, the 
CPVF used smaller units to engage and draw out the US-UN forces while the majority of the 
troops deployed along the eastern and western areas of Pukchin.231 The withdrawal stretched 
US-UN supply lines (and shortened straining CPVF logistics lines) and forced them into 
terrain with which they were unfamiliar. Using smaller units gave the impression that the 
CPVF had limited resistance capabilities and encouraged US-UN forces to pursue them 
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deeper into Peng’s trap.232 These smaller units also had greater tactical flexibility to 
maneuver, engage, break away, and reengage US-UN forces—tactics to which the Red Army 
veterans within the CPVF recognized—and thus kept the enemy preoccupied longer while 
sustaining minimal casualties. Taking advantage of these strengths small units continued to 
draw US-UN forces northward until they reached the prepared counterattack positions of the 
Unsan-Kusong line.233 
 The CPVF instituted a number of ingenious measures to limit the advantage of US-
UN armor and mechanized forces. The armor of the US-UN forces in Korea was a 
significantly different variety than what the Red Army experienced against the imperial 
Japanese. US-Un tanks possessed large caliber main guns ranging from 75mm on the US M-
24 Chaffee to 105mm on the British Centurion. Furthermore, US-UN armor mounted hull 
armor ranging from 25mm of the Chaffee to 152mm of the Centurion. Nevertheless, while 
US-UN armor posed a problem for KPA tanks, mostly older Soviet T-34/85 tanks 
comparable to the US M-26 Pershing the CPVF had no significant armor assets in Korea and 
thus adapted revolutionary guerrilla war to combat this imbalance. CPVF forces constructed 
roadblocks in order to restrict and divide UN forces and slow their advance.234 These 
roadblocks directed US-UN forces towards the CPVF prepared line. In addition to directing 
the forces into the prepared trap, roadblocks slowed the advance of US-UN forces and 
allowed time for the CPVF to complete defensive preparations. This strengthened their 
positional advantage and turned the armor strength of the US-UN into a weakness, as these 
machines became little more than turrets. Both the use of small units and the roadblocks 
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represented adaptations of the revolutionary guerrilla war principle of trading space for time. 
The Korean peninsula lacked the voluminous space of China, so in order to make the 
principle viable, it was necessary for the CPVF to increase the amount of time traded for 
limited space by making space more difficult to traverse. 
 The efforts of CPVF small units and roadblocks to direct, slow, and wear down the 
US-UN provided enough time for the CPVF defenders of Unsan-Kusong to complete their 
defensive works. Less than twenty-four hours after the preliminary air strikes on November 
24, 1950, the CPVF attacked with 200,000 troops supported by 50,000 KPA troops. This 
attack modeled a larger version of Mao’s “short attack,” an ambush on a grand scale that 
inflicted thousands of casualties.235 That evening, after protracted preliminary actions and the 
battle at the Unsan-Kusong line, UN forces were fatigued and scattered. Taking advantage of 
the situation, the CPVF launched a surprise attack with sheer force of numbers against the 
US-UN rear elements and overwhelmed their positions. This attacking the rear and flanks too 
exemplified revolutionary guerrilla war. 
 The CPVF used many elements of shock combat during their surprise attack to 
demoralize and overpower their technologically superior opposition quickly. According to 
Peng, the element of surprise contributed most to the CPVF victory in the second 
campaign.236 In addition to surprise, CPVF forces made extensive use of grenades, bayonets, 
and hand-to-hand combat so that UN forces “could not employ their superior firing power.” 
237 Grenades provided a means for individual CPVF troops to employ significantly 
disproportionate firepower for one soldier in comparison to their other weapons. The use of 
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explosive devices also allowed CPVF troops to affect larger areas with a single weapon. 
When combined with their already significant numbers, the overall battlefield effect of 
explosives en masse had a devastating effect. Furthermore, grenades and explosives used in 
such a scale exacerbated the confusion and shock of the battlefield. With UN forces 
dispersed, the CPVF created a situation advantage better suited to employ superior numbers 
to overcome the technological edge of the US-UN.  
Once dispersed, isolated and surrounded, the CPVF used hand-to-hand combat to 
annihilate enemy forces. The use of hand-to-hand combat had additional psychological 
effects by making battle a very personal matter of survival between combatants. Considering 
the strains on logistics that the CPVF experienced during this and later campaigns, Peng’s 
choice to use bayonets may have also been one of necessity. Because the CPVF relied on 
superiority of numbers, it required significant quantities of supplies. This problem worsened 
the farther south the CPVF advanced. As logistics lines lengthened, the demands to supply 
the hundreds of thousands to CPVF troops at the front increased and required greater efforts 
to transport supplies. Furthermore, the CPVF had inconsistent weapons across troops that 
added to the logistical strains of extended supply lines already present.238 The revolutionary 
guerrilla war principle of salvaging weapons and equipment from the enemy somewhat 
alleviated logistics problems. At the close of the Second Campaign, Peng reported that the 
CPVF “captured more than 6,000 enemy vehicles, about 1,000 tanks, and artillery pieces.”239 
Interestingly, US-UN accounts of lost equipment total notably less than Peng’s: about 1,000 
pieces.240 Because the CPVF already had significantly more troops than the US-UN, finding 
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adequate supplies amongst battlefield salvage proved insufficient to resupply the entire force. 
The use of battlefield salvage caused difficulties in keeping units resupplied with ammunition 
and spare parts, unless the CPVF managed to salvage additional ammunition and parts later. 
Furthermore, the mobile withdrawal north prevented the small units from collecting 
significant quantities of resupply. Eventually, US-UN forces took countermeasures to prevent 
their equipment from falling into the hands of the CPVF. Prior to their withdrawal from 
Unsan-Kusong, US-UN forces used incendiary devices such as napalm to destroy equipment 
left behind.241 Expenditure of CPVF resources and stretched supply lines plagued the CPVF 
as the battle line advanced closer to Seoul and away from the PRC-DPRK. These lengthened 
supply lines took an increasing toll on the CPVF. In a communiqué to Mao dated December 
19, 1950, Peng informed him that many troops of the CPVF slept in the open air and had no 
winter uniforms or equipment—indeed, some had no shoes whatsoever in the minus 30 
degrees centigrade Korean winter.242 In the coming months, the CPVF not only had to 
combat the US-UN, but also the elements. 
 Though the Second Campaign continued to demonstrate many of the strengths of 
revolutionary guerrilla war experienced during the First Campaign, the CPVF felt the strains 
of conducting a revolutionary guerrilla war in a foreign country. Despite a significant 
advantage of numbers, Peng recognized that the CPVF held at a severe technological 
disadvantage against the US-UN forces, especially in their lack of air support.243 The CPVF 
found successful methods to maneuver around and engage the US-UN infantry and, with the 
support of KPA tanks and combat engineering, methods to overcome US-UN mechanized 
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forces. US-UN forces adapted quickly, however, to the CPVF style of revolutionary guerrilla 
war. Overtime, US-UN forces expected overextension, surprise attacks, prolonged 
engagements, and night raids. In a manner similar to that employed by the CPVF, the US-UN 
forces pulled back just far enough each day as the CPVF could advance on foot in order to 
bait them into a trap. Furthermore, the US-UN enjoyed significant air and artillery support 
that the CPVF critically lacked. US-UN aircraft reconnaissance, bombings, and close air 
support of ground forces posed a significant challenge to the CPVF. According to Peng, 
“Enemy airplanes raided us every day, and their long-range guns shelled us day and night. 
We could not move at all during the daytime. Our troops did not have even a one-day 
break.”244 With a combination of tactical withdrawal and close air support, US-UN forces 
used methods of conventional war to inflict gradual losses, expenditures of resources, and 
fatigue on the CPVF. 
 The value of a numerical advantage waned as the Second Campaign ended. With their 
lines of supply strained and exhausted from nearly two months of nonstop combat coupled 
with incessant aerial and artillery attacks, the CPVF needed rest and resupply. By this point 
in the war, Nie estimated that the CPVF had between two and five more divisions than the 
US-UN.245 In order to alleviate some of these logistics problems, Mao ordered the 
withdrawal of 300,000 troops from the front to Northeast China; Nie later suggested a 
reduction to 260,000.246 Though this lessened the strength of one of their primary forms of 
attack, it also reduced the strain of keeping so numerable an army viable. Though smaller 
than before, the CPVF at the front still possessed significantly greater numbers than the US-
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UN. Furthermore, with supplies more efficiently distributed amongst troops, the CPVF 
gained an overall improved performance. 
 Despite the approaching winter, fatigue, insufficient and inadequate supplies, and 
other deficiencies, Mao ordered another offensive campaign to advance further south towards 
Seoul. Mao’s disregard for the hardships of the CPVF arose partly because revolutionary 
guerrilla warfare expected such hardships. According to Mao, revolutionary armies possessed 
an “indomitable spirit…determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield” that inspired 
them to fight “no matter what the difficulties and hardships, so long as a single man remains, 
he will fight on."247 Mao, Peng, Nie, and other veterans of the Red Army experienced 
hardships during the Chinese Civil War and in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Where in 
these conflicts the Red Army could draw on the Chinese peasantry for provisions, the CPVF 
could not expect the same kindness from the Korean people. Though Korean communists 
undoubtedly sympathized with the CPVF, the Korean people already dedicated their 
resources to KPA forces and stretched too thinly to support the influx of nearly a half-million 
Chinese. Despite having communist ideology in common, this did not make up for the 
cultural differences between the Chinese and the Koreans. Nevertheless, Mao believed, based 
on his experiences gained during the Chinese Civil War, that the superior numbers of CPVF 
coupled with higher morale could defeat the US-UN forces.248 As a result, the CPVF fought 
in inhospitably cold weather with insufficient clothing, inadequate food, and minimal 
supplies of ammunition.249 
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 The Third Campaign (December 31, 1950-January 9, 1951) began with a surprise 
attack on New Year’s Eve, 1950, near the 38th parallel.250 Following nine days of intense 
fighting that began on December 31, 1950, the CPVF took Seoul. Though the Third 
Campaign resulted in the conquest of Seoul and advance of CPVF to the 37th parallel, this 
victory held a tenuous status. An advance so far south significantly stretched the already 
weak supply lines of the CPVF. Furthermore, the Third Campaign also cost the CPVF many 
casualties—casualties, according to Peng, that resulted from human wave attacks.251 Finally, 
the lack of air support continued to be a significant disadvantage for the CPVF.252  
 On January 27, 1951, US-UN forces seized the initiative and launched a counter 
attacked on CPVF and KPA forces. Peng knew the dire nature of the situation. Lacking 
supplies and critical support, Peng requested permission from Mao to retreat. Mao, however, 
still held the belief that the combined efforts of the CPVF and KPA fend off the US-UN 
forces—even push them farther south—and ordered Peng to commence with the Fourth 
Campaign (January 27-April 21, 1951).253 Because of the threat of US-UN airpower and 
artillery, the CPVF consolidated their defensive works around the 38th parallel with 
underground tunnel fortifications.254 According to Mao, these tunnels acted as an 
“underground Great Wall.”255 With the construction of earthen defenses, the conflict entered 
a stalemate. No longer did US-UN aircraft and artillery able to put as much pressure on the 
CPVF and KPA.  
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 The construction of earthen defenses continued throughout the Fifth Campaign (April 
22-May 21, 1951). Similarly, US-UN forces prepared fortified defensive positions to repulse 
night attacks and raids. Peng recognized that the CPVF lacked familiarity with this style of 
warfare and the disadvantage this unacquaintedness created.256 Once entrenched in a foreign 
land, the revolutionary guerrilla war model of Mao lost its strengths. The protection of the 
tunnels came at a cost. The earthworks limited the mobility of the CPVF and KPA, as they 
could only safely operate as far as the tunnel and trench system extended. When the CPVF 
and KPA left the earthworks to attack the US-UN the safety of the tunnels limited operations 
due to how far they could advance and still be able to withdraw safely.  
 Frustrated by the inability of superiority of numbers and revolutionary guerrilla war 
to check the US-UN forces, the CPVF received heavy conventional support. In April 1951, 
Chinese T-34 tanks and heavy artillery entered Korea.257 This alteration in the PRC approach 
to warfare represented their recognition of the limitations of revolutionary guerrilla warfare 
outside of country attacked. These forces, however, failed to inflict significant defeats on US-
UN forces. This occurred, more often than not, because US-UN armor outflanked and 
outmaneuvered Chinese armor.258 Being in the transition from a revolutionary army to a 
conventional force, the PLA lacked the training and experience using armor that their US-UN 
opposition possessed. Though the CMC issued the creation of three tank brigades in 1950, 
these new tank crews could not develop competency in mechanized warfare competitive with 
their opposition in one year’s time. 
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 During the Fifth Campaign that Mao advised Peng to approach battle with greater 
patience and engage the US-UN as if “eating sticky candy;”259 that is, one little bite at a time. 
This iteration of warfare took shape during the summer and fall of 1951 after the CPVF 
completed their tunnel and trench systems. With these positions in place, the CPVF 
concentrated their available forces and firepower in covert offensives designed to eliminate 
one small portion of US-UN forces, generally ranging from platoon to battalion in size.260 
The persistent significant resource of the CPVF remained superiority of numbers. During the 
Fifth Campaign, the CPVF and KPA forces numbered 700,000 against 340,000 US-UN 
troops.261 Reliance on numerical superiority came with a cost. The CPVF still struggled to 
adjust to larger operational management with inadequate supplies and varied weapons.262 
Such disunity of equipment made it difficult for the CPVF to acquire supplies and organize 
combat operations, especially when CPVF units lacked particular weapons that they required. 
Many commanding officers in the CPVF, like Peng, insisted upon abandoning the 
earthworks, luring the US-UN into the northern areas, and carry out defensive guerilla 
operations there.263 With their advantage in numbers, shortened supply lines, and ability to 
acquire battlefield salvage, such an approach provided the CPVF an opportunity to use their 
strengths and experience to good effect against the US-UN. Mao, however, stood fast in his 
in his determination to hold every inch of Korea. Following the Fifth Campaign, Mao 
realized that the total victory objectives of the Korean War proved unachievable with the 
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current limits of the CPVF, and by extension the KPA.264 Mao ordered the CPVF to engage 
the US-UN in a protracted defensive war265 in order to preserve CPVF-KPA gains. The 
CPVF, however, received orders to continue fighting during the peace negotiations.266 While 
the entrenched defensive nature of the “underground Great Wall” prohibited the trading of 
space for time advocated in the revolutionary guerrilla war model, the continuation of 
hostilities during peace negotiations allowed the CPVF to trade words for time until an 
armistice. While revolutionary guerrilla warfare marks protracted war as a strategic hallmark 
in Korea, the CPVF could not overcome the stalemate at the 38th parallel. 
 Three months prior to CPVF’s crossing into Korea, on July 12, 1950, Zhou Enlai 
issued a list of five objectives of the CPVF in Korea: (1) all foreign troops withdraw from 
Korea; (2) US forces withdraw from the Taiwan Strait; (3) the issue of the Korean leadership 
be resolved by the Korean people; (4) Beijing take control of the China seat in the US-UN; 
(5) and Japan and China sign a peace treaty.267 These initial objectives held much more for 
China than Mao’s purported sympathies for a communist state under siege. These objectives 
possessed as amalgamation of the various interests of the CMC leadership and Mao for the 
security of China, a demonstration of the military might of the PLA, and the continuing of an 
Asian communist revolution. As the war led to a prolonged stalemate at the 38th parallel, the 
CMC realized that the CPVF lacked the resources or abilities to attain the initial objectives of 
Chinese intervention. Throughout the war, the CPVF relied primarily on superior numbers in 
order to overcome the technological disparity with the US-UN. These numbers, however, 
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proved too large for the available logistical support of the PRC to deliver sufficient supplies, 
especially over the significant distances between the PRC and 38th parallel in the harsh 
Korean winters. Though the CPVF initially relied on battlefield salvage, once the battle 
turned into a stalemate and the US-UN forces took measures to deprive the CPVF of 
recovered materials, CMC plans for logistics failed to develop.  
 Nevertheless, the numerical advantage of the CPVF could not compensate for their 
lack of air power. US-UN airpower and artillery forced the CPVF to alter their approach to 
the war from one of mobility and revolutionary operations to a static “underground Great 
Wall” with armor and artillery support. Once settled in static defensive positions, US-UN 
forces developed better abilities to predict the directions and timings of CPVF attacks and 
take appropriate defensive measures. Furthermore, despite the construction of underground 
tunnels and trenches, US-UN air power continued to harass CPVF and KPA forces and lines 
of communication and supply. Once dug in, the CPVF could not achieve their primary 
objective of driving US-UN forces from the peninsula.268 
 After experiencing some of the most traumatic combat in the memory of the twentieth 
century, once the balance of power on the peninsula returned to pre-war conditions, many 
leaders in the CPVF and DPRK felt the time arrived to do away with the original objectives 
for the CPVF and reconsider the situation. Once his state secure, prime minister Kim Il-sung 
sought to end the war in 1951.269 Even Nie argued that by reestablishing the DPRK’s prewar 
boundaries, the CPVF attained its political goals.270 Nevertheless, Mao insisted that the 
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conflict continue in order to gain victory, or at least some advantage.271 President 
Eisenhower’s diplomacy of nuclear force brought China to the peace table.272 On July 27, 
1953, Mao, the PRC, the DPRK, and the US-UN reached amicable terms for an armistice. 
General Mark W. Clark commented when he signed the armistice, “This is the first time in 
American history that an American general signs an armistice of a no-win war.”273 
 For the Chinese, the “war to resist American imperialists” provided a significant 
event at the dawning of the CCP. It represented a test of the fledgling People’s Liberation 
Army against another organized, industrially capable, technologically advanced adversary 
(the previous example being Imperial Japan). While China failed to push the US-UN forces 
from Korea, it did demonstrate the military power of the PRC to halt the advances of 
industrialized and technologically superior forces.274 This partial victory of the Korean War 
also served to build the cultural-nationalism of the young PRC. According to Nie, “Through 
the War to Resist America and Aid Korea, our country has become more united, and our 
people have become more confident in their ability defeat any foreign invaders.”275 This 
revolutionary spirit, reinvigorated by the Korean War, continued to infuse Chinese culture for 
a considerable portion of the twentieth century. Because of the CPVF involvement in Korea, 
“China could never have been what it is today.”276 
 In order for the PRC and PLA to be competitive with other industrialized powers, it 
needed improved manufacturing capabilities and more advanced technologies. Recognizing 
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this weakness during the Korea War, China sought to develop technologies to manufacture 
conventional and atomic weapons in order to ensure the security and supremacy of the PLA 
in future conflicts.277 As the war progressed, the CPVF changed as means allowed from a 
revolutionary army to be a “mirror” of the US in their adoption of joint operations and 
standardized weapons in order to be a more flexible and easily maintained force.278 This last 
element, the limits of logistics, particularly plagued the CPVF from the Second Campaign 
onward. Peng recognized the limitations of the CPVF and advocated significant steps to 
improve it along Soviet lines in order to compete against Western countries in future 
conflicts.279 Considering the growing tensions between the USSR and PRC, however, such 
an arrangement proved questionable. Because of the immense experience gained by PRC 
officers and soldiers who survived the Korean War,280 it was not out of the question for the 
CMC to use their experiences to rebuild the PLA in a more culturally homogeneous fashion, 
rather than relying on the assistance of the USSR. Nevertheless, as a result of the Korean 
War, China made great leaps to close the technological gap by procuring from the USSR 
advanced conventional weapons to outfit over 60 infantry divisions from 1951-1954.281 A 
few of these weapons trickled into the hands of the CPVF; only in 1952 did Chinese forces 
employed a notable quantity against US-UN forces, approximately 45,000.282 
 The experiences of the CPVF during the Korean War demonstrated the limitations of 
revolutionary guerrilla war and large multi-national/cultural forces. First, revolutionary 
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guerrilla war has limited capabilities outside of the country where the cultural-national troops 
originated. As noted elsewhere, the CPVF had little direct and appreciable familiarity with 
the terrain and climate of Korea and thus proved insufficiently prepared for the winter 
climate, a situation that undoubtedly had an adverse effect on their fighting ability. Because 
the CPVF was the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force, it could not accept the same form of 
support from the Korean people as the Red Army received during the Chinese Communist 
Revolution. Even within the framework of an ideological struggle where the two cultures 
share the same underpinning belief, their inherent cultural differences inevitably complicate 
their working relationship. In such a situation, Mao and his model of revolutionary guerrilla 





THE VIABILITY OF AN ALTERNATE CHALLENGE 
There exists amongst the scholarship on Mao’s military thought and theory a conflict 
as to whether Mao subscribed to Western conceptualizations of war, exempla gratia the 
theories put forth by Carl von Clausewitz, or the traditional Chinese notions.  According to 
Tien Chen-ya, “Mao consistently accepted Clausewitz’s definition of war, that is, the 
relationship between war and politics.”283  Presumably, Tien referred to the renowned line 
from On War, “War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of 
other means.”284  In his military writings Mao did mention Clausewitz, but not with a direct 
quotation that connected to this idea.  For example, Mao quoted Clausewitz’s assessments of 
wars having varying forms in different periods in On Guerrilla Warfare but not the famed 
“relationship between war and politics” Tien described.285  Nearly twenty years after the 
composition of On Guerrilla Warfare and the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Allied powers, 
Mao prohibited the consultation of Clausewitz: “Clausewitz should no longer be read since 
the Germans had been defeated.”286  Mao certainly possessed knowledge of Clausewitz, but 
neither attributed his theories to his works or made the references Tien claimed.  
Unfortunately, this conclusion seems to negate the important intricacies of the Chinese 
military tradition that many Western-focused studies tend to overlook. 
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 The Age of Imperialism brought about a notion of the military superiority of Western 
nations.  These European, North American, and European-modeled states possessed 
supposedly inherent superior militaries because of cultural traits, according to the Western-
centric historiography that persists to this day.  These definitive characteristics included 
reliance on advanced technologies, discipline and drill, and the mobilization of economical 
means behind a single-minded military expansion into the world characterized the corner 
stone of this theory.287  The victory of the British and other European expeditionary forces to 
open treaty ports in China and the triumphs of Western (and Western-modeled Japanese) 
militaries over the Qing during the Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860), the First Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895), and the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) include some of the most 
crucial and often cited instances used to illustrate the supposed superior power of Western 
military might in the face of a stereotyped pacifistic, weak, and primitive Asian way of 
war—or so some historiographical interpretations purport.  Whether created by 
circumstances of geographic, linguistic, or ethnocentric barriers, Asian military history in 
Western scholarship most often remained quartered off as an oddity of sorts until serious 
erudition on the subject appeared in the English language during the twentieth century.  Since 
then, the efforts of authors such as Roger T. Ames, Ralph D. Sawyer, Peter Lorge, Karl 
Friday, John K. Fairbank, Hans van de Ven, Kenneth Swope, Li Xiaobing, and Jian Chen, 
established for non-Asian readers a sense of the richness and depth of East Asia’s developed 
and formidable military history that in many ways parallels and in key instances surpasses 
that of the West.   
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 Two of the prime advocates of the supremacy of the Western Way of War, Victor D. 
Hansen and Geoffrey Parker, argue that one of the key factors to Western military dominance 
was reliance on superior technology.288  This conclusion seems rather simple and 
ethnocentric to presume that one culture possesses a preoccupation with technology greater 
than another does, especially when matters of individual, societal, cultural, and state survival 
intertwine therein.  What’s more, this approach ignores the basic reality that technologies 
embody tools and all humans, as a species regardless of location or culture, understand the 
importance of tools that provide a meaningful addition to their lives.  According to Peter 
Lorge, technology, like any creative endeavor, is as much an element of culture as other arts 
such as painting, music, or literature.289  Necessity and apparent usefulness lead to the 
creation and implementation of technologies.  In warfare, these conditions often manifest as 
one belligerent’s desires to obtain a greater advantage in offense or defense that allows them 
to overcome the opposition more easily.  Advanced technologies were not the sole privilege 
of the West.  Much like the historiographical debate of the Western Military Revolution  
initiated by Michael Roberts 1955 lecture, John K. Fairbank argued that technological 
improvements initiated reforms and restructuring in Chinese armies.290  According to 
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Fairbank, the development of technologies such as the crossbow and iron weapons from the 
fourth century BCE instituted a number of organizational and communication reforms in 
Chinese forces that resulted ultimately in larger, better organized, and highly disciplined 
armies.  Perhaps one of the most astounding was the invention of the crossbow during the 
middle Warring States period, c. fourth century BCE.291  This weapon provided Chinese 
states with the opportunity to raise larger numbers of ranged attack troops that also required 
less training Chinese armies as it allowed the Chinese government to equip larger numbers of 
ranged troops with less training and expenses than to arm foot or mounted archers.  This 
development spread to the west, as Western military historians may recall, and European 
armies and mercenaries used it extensively during the Crusades, eleventh-thirteenth centuries 
CE, and Hundred Years War, c. fourteenth-fifteenth centuries CE—nearly fifteen-hundred 
years after the development of the crossbow in China.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
resulted from attempts to solve tactical problems of combining ranged and close attacks and 
how to unite hitting power, mobility, and defensive strength.  Early modern commanders 
found the solution to this equation in firearms.  This alteration created four distinct changes: 
(1) a revolution in tactics; (2) significantly larger armies; (3) creation of more complex 
strategies to make use of larger armies; (4) and an increased effect of war on society 
including higher costs, greater damage, and increased administrative challenges.  While 
initially, little disagreement with Roberts’ conclusions surfaced, discord arose during the 
later decades of the twentieth century among Western military historians as to whether the 
precepts of Roberts’ theory possessed credibility as to the timing of the beginning of and, if 
indeed such a phenomenon occurred, the specific causes of the supposed Military 
Revolution.  Geoffrey Parker, Jeremy Black, and Kelly DeVries later published interesting 
analyses and critiques of Roberts’ work that attempted to alter the dates of the supposed 
revolution, to noting the value of the framework for discussion provided by Roberts, to 
outright denying a military revolution ever occurred and instead arguing that the phenomena 
described as such was actually a military evolution.  Michael Roberts, “The Military 
Revolution, 1560-1660,” in The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military 
Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 13 and Geoffrey 
Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-2. 
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Discipline amongst Western military forces stands as a hallmark of the supposed 
Western Way of War.  Ethnocentric Western histories of the early conflict between Western 
and Western-modeled forces from the period spanning 1793-1945, including the Opium 
Wars, the Boxer Rebellion, and the First Sino-Japanese War depict the Chinese as backward 
and superstitious mobs easily overcome with firepower, discipline, and bayonet.  These 
approaches fail to appreciate the longer and deeper military history of China that includes 
discipline as a similar hallmark.  China was, according to Ken Swope, “one of the only Non-
Western states to emphasize training and drilling.”292  Drill, as in the coordination of forces 
in an organized manner, existed in order to foster teamwork, cooperation, self and unit 
discipline, and most fundamentally to move large numbers of troops from place to place as 
expediently as possible.  This circumstance arose, and understandably so, as China possessed 
a far-reaching history of mounting numerically significant armies.  Estimates of troop 
strength from the seventh through sixth centuries BCE range from 10,000 men to 50,000 men 
per army amongst the then dominant infantry centered forces.293  Period texts from the 
Warring States, beginning in the fifth century BCE, suggested some armies fielded forces as 
large as 600,000 men.294   
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 To maintain discipline within units, Chinese armies had to maintain order through a 
well-structured hierarchy.  This unit discipline originated with the commanders who made 
use of existing hierarchies, especially those as articulated by Confucianism that articulated 
specific behaviors of a person based on his relationship with family, state, and friends.  
Confucianism extolled the supremacy of culture/civilization (wen) over martial supremacy 
(wu).  Indeed, in the Confucian hierarchy contained no place literally for a martial class.  The 
key tenets of deference to authority and improving the self through arduous work and study, 
however, proved quite useful in reinforcing military discipline and order.  War indeed served 
an important part of Chinese political thought.  The most important purpose for war was to 
establish order, whether through the suppression of rebellions, defeat of raiding barbarians, 
or overthrowing a despotic and ineffective government that lost the Mandate of Heaven.295  
The Tai Gong, for example, emphasized proper behavior between social groups in addition to 
military discipline.  For example, “If you set up the proper forms of etiquette [li], the li can 
be perfected.296   Sunzi described this accordance between people and the ruler as the Dao.297  
Civilian hierarchies possessed limitations, however, when it came to war, as Sunzi also 
warned readers that rulers should not interfere with the authority of the commander, though 
originating from the ruler, once in battle.298  One only need to read as far as the work of the 
icon of Western warfare, Clausewitz, to note that war even in the West is a last resort of 
politics rather than a phenomenon ex nihilo.299  The role of discipline in Chinese military 
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history extends much deeper than presented herein.  The prime importance of this discipline 
came from the necessity to coordinate and conduct operations effectively, funded by 
immense state resources and personnel over great distances.  Even so, from a pragmatic 
perspective discipline functioned as a central element in war because governing bodies asked 
human beings to engage in counterintuitive, self-destructive behavior while destroying other 
human beings. 
 An interesting case where extreme discipline on the parts of an Eastern and Western 
army confronted one another was the Korean War.  During this conflict, Western, id est 
United Nations, forces were disciplined and trained according to the prevailing beliefs in a 
unique Western military tradition.  Similarly, the Eastern, id est Chinese, forces were 
disciplined in their prevailing ideals of Chinese-Revolutionary Warfare and the victory of the 
proletariat over the imperialist West.  Despite the differing details, both forces were well 
tempered by training, hardship, and culture to endure the horrors of battle and engage their 
enemy, be he superior in technology or numbers.  This discipline manifested with the UN 
forces in their steadfastness to hold their positions until forced back due to lack of resources 
in the face of overwhelming odds and in the Chinese with their determination to engage the 
technologically superior UN forces in hand-to-hand combat.  Though discipline was hardly 
the single factor that contributed to the stalemate at the 38th Parallel, it was certainly an 
important contributing factor.  Arguably, the Korean War served as the epitome of the 
conflict between Chinese and Anglo-American Ways of War. 
During the middle of the twentieth century, the supposed supremacy of the Western 
Way of War became questionable and shaky as warfare in East and South East Asia provided 
serious challenges to this long help presumption.  Two conflicts in these regions illustrate the 
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shortcomings of conventional Western war making.  The victory of the Chinese Red Army 
against both the US supported Guomindang and the Chinese People’s Volunteer’s parity 
against the US-UN, as well as the victory of the North Vietnamese over the Republic of 
South Vietnam illustrated some of the difficulties that the Western way of war faced in the 
mid-twentieth century.  Because of the significantly different abilities in terms of 
organization, industry, and operational advantages between the Western and Asian forces, as 
well as the fluid, adaptable, and pragmatic nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, 
conventional Western forces formed by the works of men like von Clausewitz found 
themselves in unfamiliar physical and doctrinal terrain. This Chinese military tradition of 
nearly two millennia armed the Chinese Communist Party and the Viet Minh with skills that 
allowed them to outmaneuver, outlast, and eventually overcome conventional and Western 
influenced opposition.  Mao determined that in order for his forces to succeed against the 
imperial Japanese and the Guomindang, they had to organize, consolidate, and defend.300  
This approach held resonance with the traditional avocation to attack when circumstances 
proved advantageous and efficacious rather than charge headlong into a battle with no chance 
of victory.  Once in a stable defensive position, Mao decided that the guerilla CCP should 
expand its ranks and carryout asymmetrical warfare with sabotage, terrorism, assassination, 
et cetera, in order to build supplies of war material and experience.301   
This style of warfare, often described as “small wars,” characterizes the greatest 
challenges to the West during the twentieth century.  For a significant period, Western 
warfare encountered these styles of conflict in remote places where the “fought only 
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secondarily against human foes, the real enemies being climate, disease, distance, lack of 
food and water, and inhospitable terrain.”302  And these constraints hold true for the United 
States in Vietnam.  The preparations of the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh, for example, 
followed many of the guidelines developed and collected in Mao’s writing on guerilla 
warfare.  The longer the United States committed to hostilities in Vietnam, the longer popular 
opinion of the war dematerialized, especially following the Tet Offensive and the My Lai 
Massacre.303  If one defining hallmark of a supposed Chinese model of war persisted 
throughout the ages that proved elusive to the West, especially the Unites States, this 
attribute rests in patience to commit to lengthy campaigns that bleed the opposition of 
resources, men, and support at home.  Often—and into the twenty-first century—technology 
appealed to Western military planners as a quick fix to solve these small wars.  Whether born 
from experiences of the imperial era or from another source, having the most innovative 
weapon no longer—indeed, rarely during history—proved to be the defining factor of battle.  
To consider such the case divorces studies and assessments of the human element of war, in 
both terms of the admirable heroism of people under duress as well as the all too unfortunate 
human suffering experiences during the violence of combat. 
THE HUMAN WAY OF WAR 
 “Violent conflict between states or polities is now mankind’s common problem, a 
unifying menace.”304  Perhaps the most important element of war that extends beyond 
cultures without equivocation is violence.  Though long held and misconceived impressions 
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of Eastern warfare are contrary, traditional Chinese interpretations of war hold that violence 
is a necessary element of war.  According to the Methods of the Sima, violence is a necessity 
in war to restore order and eliminate oppressive governments.305  This is not violence for the 
sake of violence or war for the sake of war, but rather recognition that war is a bloody affair 
necessary to create peace.  Much in the way of some Confucian interpretations of strictness 
as necessary to form and direct human behavior, violence in war is necessary to restore peace 
and order, especially in the works produces by authors such as Mozi. 
 The sheer volume of violence perpetrated by combatants often appears as a keen 
element of warfare of the Western tradition, especially within the notion of total war.  
Discussions of the efficacy of such a label as total war aside, similar descriptions of appeared 
in classical Chinese military texts that proscribed the use of all available means to 
discourage, intimidate, and destroy the enemy, though arguably these approaches more 
closely resembled the idea of deterrence associated with nuclear war theory.  Conjoined to 
the notion of total war appeared the idea that states must prepare for war by always 
anticipating the possibility of conflict and readying accordingly to employ the available 
means of production; appearing weak the foster overconfidence in the enemy; create 
disharmony in the enemy through subterfuge; provide the means for the enemy to dismantle 
their own war machine.306  This bore striking resemblance to the often quoted “si vi pacum 
para bellum” that in order for states to desire peace and security, they must continually 
prepare for the possibility of conflict.  Such seemed quite in line with the Western mode of 
war, especially industrialized war characterized by World Wars I and II, but more over 
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demonstrated that between the two cultures there existed an idea that some conflicts are 
simply so massive or perhaps so crucial that the option of defeat never entered the possible 
realms of conclusion. 
 In these large patterns, no significant difference between an Eastern and a Western 
way of war surfaced.  This condition existed because, despite differences in periods, cultures, 
regions, technologies, the perpetrators, combatants, and victims of war always were human 
beings.  Thus, while cultural nuances may affect certain details of wars, periods restrict the 
technologies available, and regions necessitate the use of one form of attack or defense over 
another, war continues to serve as an activity that bridges periods, cultures, and regions.  It is 
excessively narrow-minded to conclude that a military or government would adopt a 
purposefully weak military stance because of nothing more than cultural tendencies.  Though 
cultures may influence war and war influence cultures, when able states adopt the most 
advantageous technologies and methods available.307  Human beings possess a viciously 
competitive nature, no matter what culture, and this is especially the case in competitions 
where annihilation is a possible outcome for one competitor.  This primal competition, where 
issues of nation and culture seem to fade from the consciousness of the combatants, who 
instead focus on the immediacy of the moment, the then-and-now struggle of one spearman 
struggling against another or one rifleman sighting down on another, that the axiom “war 
never changes” enters the most real manifestation that ultimately, despite the supposed 
progress of man, the lingering reality of war as organized violence, seeking to exert influence 
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and bring peace upon a chaotic situation through the means of violence available will 
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